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Introduction
Most of human interaction can be considered as negotiations of some form. As a consequence,
literature on bargaining, be it theory or applications, is ubiquitous and, when it comes to
applications, very diverse. Research topics range from marital bargaining, acknowledging
the fact that married couples are almost constantly negotiating over a variety of matters to
international relations concerned with negotiations among national governments on economic,
environmental or territorial issues. Of course, also commodity prices are often the outcome
of negotiations and analyzed by the means of bargaining theory. Quite generally, in this
dissertation, I am interested in the variables that determine the outcome of negotiations and
especially the factors that lead to their breakdown.
With respect to bargaining theory, basically all research can be traced back to the seminal
works of Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982). I will give a brief overview of bargaining
theory and anchor the theoretic concepts used in this dissertation in the section Bargaining
Theory. I will then provide an outline of the specific problems and situations to which I
apply bargaining theory in the section Bargaining Applications.
Bargaining Theory
In any bargaining situation, individuals see the possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial
agreement but are not consent about how this agreement should look like. There is an inherent
conflict of interest about how the gains from bargaining should be distributed among the
involved parties. It is the aim of bargaining theory to identify solutions to these distributional
problems.
Real world bargaining is usually tied to a bargaining process, and the outcome of bargain-
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ing very much depends on the specific procedural features of this process, such as who can
make offers and when. Nash (1950) abstracts away from such procedural features and consid-
ers only the set of agreements that satisfy “reasonable” properties, that are conditions that
any outcome arrived at by rational decision makers should satisfy a priori. These conditions
are treated as axioms, from which the outcome is deduced. The resulting Nash bargaining
solution is pinned down only by the axioms of underlying expected utility, in addition to
symmetry and independence of irrelevant alternatives. It has the remarkable property that
the outcome is implemented cooperatively and uniquely by maximizing the players’ utilities.
Nash’s axiomatic approach to solve the two-person bargaining problem has become the
foundation of modern bargaining theory. Still, even Nash felt the need to provide a non-
cooperative foundation of his very abstract cooperative solution concept and came up with
an explicitly modeled strategic game in Nash (1953). In the Nash demand game, two players
make simultaneous demands and agreement is only reached if the combined demands are
feasible. As is the problem with most non-cooperative models, the Nash demand game
has multiple equilibria since any split constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Nash (1953) solves
the problem by introducing uncertainty in the payoff function and obtains that the Nash
bargaining solution is the unique limiting outcome of the demand game when uncertainty
vanishes. Ever since, game theorists have set out to construct non-cooperative bargaining
games with the purpose to validate the axiomatic solution concept and broaden the scope of
its applicability.1
The most famous non-cooperative approach in this vein, is the two-person bargaining
game analyzed in Rubinstein (1982) in which players make alternating offers over the division
of a pie that shrinks over time because of costs of delay. Rubinstein is able to show that the
game has a unique solution, depending on who makes the first offer. Further, it is shown in
Binmore (1987) that the non-cooperative equilibria of the Rubinstein game converge to the
Nash bargaining solution when delay between offers goes to zero. Nevertheless, the Rubinstein
outcome can only approximate Nash’s solution because the costs of delay can never become
completely insignificant as they constitute the driving force behind the bargaining process.2
1This endeavor is commonly referred to as the “Nash program”.
2Without costs of delay, the bargaining process is indeterminate. The bargaining could go on
indefinitely because the players have no incentive to strike a deal today rather than tomorrow.
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The axiomatic approach has the advantage that it determines a unique outcome by a
fairly simple formula and is therefore very attractive to applied economics with a focus not
especially on the bargaining process. It has the disadvantage that its application is limited
to bargaining situation that fit the underlying axioms. Strategic models on the other hand
can be tailored to the particular specifications of any bargaining situation. On the downside,
this makes them very sensitive to procedural changes: even small changes in the rules of the
bargaining process can have a decisive impact on the bargaining outcome.
In light of the different virtues and shortcomings of the cooperative and non-cooperative
approach, it is now the prevalent view in bargaining literature that axiomatic and strategic
models are complementary (see Sutton 1986). The reason for choosing an exclusively non-
cooperative perspective in this thesis was to stay as close as possible to related literature.
Chapter 1 is based on a bargaining game with outside options and an infinite horizon
in which a player is randomly chosen in every period to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In
this game, reject and counteroffer is not a possible move but rejection of an offer immediately
results in the breakdown of bargaining and the players taking up their respective outside
options. In case of agreement, bargaining continues in the next period. The main ingredients
in this set-up are the outside options and repeated interaction. Outside options are relevant
because I focus on a crisis bargaining application in which outside options are usually mod-
eled as the states payoffs from going to war.3 Repeated interaction is crucial because I study
the effect of commitment problems on the bargaining outcome. Commitment problems only
arise when a party involved cannot credibly commit to an agreement because it can demand
revisions later in time. The inability to commit is only relevant in repeated interaction.
The game is an extension of the bargaining model used in Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006)
in the context of crisis bargaining with commitment problems and has not been analyzed
before. In their models only one player has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer
in every period which means that this player has the entire bargaining power. I relax this
assumption by introducing random proposal power which gives both players some bargaining
power.
3see for example Powell (2006)
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As a variation of this bargaining set-up, in Chapter 2 I analyze a one-time bargain-
ing game with the possibility of counteroffers and a possibly infinite horizon that is close to
the Rubinstein game only that there are random proposers instead of alternating offers and
two-sided outside options. I find that both bargaining models, the models in Chapter 1 and
2 have an equilibrium which generates identical subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. The
proof draws on Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989) who first studied the effect of outside
options on the bargaining outcome and introduced the notion of ‘outside option principle’
by identifying the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of a Rubinstein bargaining game with
outside options.
In Chapter 3, I considerably reduce complexity with regard to the bargaining game in
order to concentrate on the principal-agent relationship which is the driving force in this
model. Since I am no longer interested in a temporal dimension, I skip repeated interaction
so that the bargaining game boils down to a one-time take-it-or-leave-it offer game with out-
side options and random proposers. This has the advantage that the game is considerably
simpler and easier to solve. Still, the important features of the crisis bargaining process
are retained: both sides have bargaining power and the possibility to opt out and go to
war. In addition, I introduce asymmetric information: the players outside options are now
private information. The impact of such private information on the crisis bargaining out-
come has first been analyzed in Powell (1996). Ever since, asymmetric information about the
opponent’s outside option is considered a potential rational reason for the breakdown of inter-
national negotiations and the onset of war (see Fearon 1995). By showing that democracies
can overcome such information asymmetries, I provide a rational reason for the ‘democratic
peace’, that is, the empirical observation that democracies rarely fight wars with one another.
Chapter 4 retains information asymmetries as a potential source of breakdown but ap-
plies the bargaining set-up to a simple market structure. The market structure is a version
of Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons in which trade is decentralized and buyers and sellers
are randomly matched. As an extension of Akerlofs model, the buyer side is not completely
uninformed about quality but a share of buyers is equally informed as the sellers. Once
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matched, a seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer who can either accept the offer
or reject it. This is the most rudimentary version of a bargaining situation but it captures
the common praxis in many markets, for example most retail markets, that prices are simply
posted by sellers, without the buyer having much influence on the price.4 This set-up al-
lows the analysis of the price formation process because, unlike Akerlof’s centralized market
version, equilibrium need not be exclusively defined by a single price equating supply and
demand but may be characterized by different prices (see Wilson 1980).
Bargaining Applications
Chapters 1-3 of this dissertation apply bargaining theory to international relations and aim
to shed light on rational reasons for war and peace. The idea to analyze war arguments on
the basis of bargaining models has been initiated by Fearon (1995). In his seminal work on
rationalist explanations for war, Fearon (1995) provides a coherent theory about the occur-
rence of war by introducing a formalization of the bargaining problem faced by two states
in conflict and on these grounds establishes two main rational causes of war: information
asymmetries and commitment problems. While commitment problems play the central role
in Chapters 1 and 2, asymmetric information is explored in Chapter 3.
Commitment problems are present in many bargaining situations that are characterized by
a temporal dimension. The parties involved in these interactions must be confident that
agreements made in the present will be binding in future periods or else they might prefer
to abstain from an agreement altogether. A commitment is not credible if one party has
the incentive to renege on an earlier agreement. In the context of international relations,
an increasingly powerful state may be unable to credibly commit to a current settlement
because it can demand revisions later in time. Anticipating this, a declining state may have
reason to fight in the present in order to guarantee itself a minimum of the stakes. It is
Fearon (1995) who first connects commitment problems to the idea of preventive wars by
4Of course there are also markets in which prices are the outcome of actual bilateral negotiations
with offers and counteroffers, for example bazaars, and there is a line of literature investigating the
pros and cons of the two pricing institutions also in the context of asymmetric quality information.
See for example Bester (1993) and Arnold and Lippman (1998).
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showing that anticipated future shifts in power are a rational reason for a declining state to
start war. Later Powell (2006) expands on Fearon’s analysis by showing that this mechanism
also explains related phenomena like preemptive attacks and bargaining over issues that, by
themselves, are sources of bargaining power.
While formalizing the argument that adverse shifts in power between states in conflict can
lead to preventive war is an important step in understanding the reasons for war, there are
still historic examples that contradict this prediction and one question remains: why do states
not always respond to the anticipation of substantial negative power shifts with a strategy of
preventive war and sometimes do fight preventively even though a shift in (military) power
has not occurred? Chapters 1-2 aim to solve this puzzle by breaking down the concept of
power and identifying the kind of power that can trigger preventive war.
Bargaining power can be defined as a measure of a player’s relative power to extract a
share from the opponent during negotiation with respect to the opponent’s power to do the
same. In this sense, a party’s bargaining power is captured by its share of the surplus. In war
bargaining models, bargaining power is usually determined by the power to make proposals
and the outside option payoff, which is the expected payoff, a country receives by going to
war. This war payoff, in turn, is determined by a party’s probability to win the war and
the pie it will receive in case of winning, decimated by the party’s costs of fighting. In the
literature, so far, only a shift in military power has been analyzed. An increase in military
power directly translates into increased bargaining power since it alters both parties’ outside
option payoffs through the winning probability. But as pointed out above, there are other
means to increase bargaining leverage than military power, namely changes in the parties’
respective costs of war and changes in the level of proposal power.
The models in Chapters 1-2 explicitly investigate these other means and find that war is
only an equilibrium outcome if a state expects a reduction in its war payoff. On the other
hand, war does not occur if the declining state’s outside option is unaffected by the rising
state’s enhanced bargaining position.
Chapter 3 also draws on Fearon’s bargaining approach to war, in the attempt to pro-
vide a rational explanation of the “democratic peace”, that is, the empirical observation that
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democracies tend not to fight wars with one another. I argue that democracies can overcome
information asymmetries so that this rational reason for war dissolves when democracies are
involved. The means by which democracies achieve this result, is successful signaling of their
type due to general transparency within democracies. The model’s theoretic underpinning is
the principal-agent nature of democratic political systems and the fact that the actual bar-
gaining with a third party is delegated to an elected representative (agent), a practice which
is common when one side involved in the bargaining process consists of a group of people
(principal). There are other examples of delegated bargaining, like elected labor union leaders
representing their union members when bargaining with management, politicians bargaining
for their constituencies in domestic politics, and boards of directors bargaining on behalf of
company shareholders. The model applies the idea of delegated bargaining to the literature
on war initiation and analyzes how transparency within democracies and accountability of
political representatives help overcome information asymmetries. The results of this analysis
are then used to find out what degree of agency transparency is preferable in an international
bargaining setting, comparing two scenarios, open-door bargaining in which the democratic
public can observe the bargaining process between its representative and a third party and
closed-door bargaining, in which the agent’s actions are partly hidden.
Chapter 4 is also concerned with bargaining in the presence of asymmetric information
but shifts the focus to a competitive market situation in which the quality of the good is
the sellers’ private information. Following Akerlof (1970), the prediction for such markets is
that, when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low and buyers cannot distin-
guish quality, bad products drive out good products and only low-quality units trade in the
competitive equilibrium. This dynamic is termed adverse selection and has been investigated
in the context of various settings, such as health insurance and labor markets.
The model relaxes the general assumption that the buyer side is completely uninformed
and integrates informed buyers into the lemons market. I investigate how the presence of
informed buyers affects adverse selection and welfare by comparing two different market
structures: one in which sellers cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed buyers
and one in which sellers can learn whether a buyer is informed or not and price-discriminate
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on an individual level. I find that the presence of informed buyers reduces adverse selection
and a sufficiently high share of informed buyers even induces an efficient fully-separating
equilibrium. This is the reason why in most cases individual price discrimination leads to a
welfare reduction.
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Chapter 1
Commitment Problems in
International Bargaining1
Abstract
When contracts are not enforceable, bargaining can break down because of commitment
problems. In the international context, standard models predict that a shift in military
power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between
states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment
problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if
the relative bargaining position changes substantially.
1see Amann, Erwin and Nadine Leonhardt (2013): Commitment Problems in International Bar-
gaining, Ruhr Economic Papers 403
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1.1 Introduction
Commitment problems arise if the relative bargaining position between states changes and
an increasingly powerful state is unable to credibly commit to a current settlement because
it can demand revisions later in time. Anticipating this, a declining state may have reason
to fight now in order to still guarantee itself a minimum of the stakes.
Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006) formalize this argument in a bargaining model in which
war constitutes the parties’ outside option. We describe the war payoff as the result of a
costly lottery that is determined by a party’s military power and her costs of fighting. In
the literature, so far, only shifts in military power have been analyzed and associated with
commitment problems and the risk of war.2 The implications of changes in the parties’
respective costs of war have not been studied yet. Also, previous works have not explicitly
modeled bargaining power so that the effects of changes in bargaining power are still unclear.3
The present paper introduces variable proposal power which facilitates the analysis of
situations in which both parties have some bargaining power. We show that a shift in bar-
gaining power affects the distribution of the bargaining surplus, but does not lead to war.
Also, an isolated decrease in one party’s costs of war can have an impact on the realative
bargaining position but never causes war. On the other hand, war can occur in equilibrium
if a party’s costs of war increase even though military power does not change.
1.2 The Basic Model
In every period, states A (he) and B (she) bargain about the distribution of an issue of size pi.
With probability α state A can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to B, with probability 1−α it
is the other way around. A state’s proposal is denoted xti ∈ [0, pi] where xti refers to the share
of the pie that state i receives in period t. A state can respond to a proposal in two ways:
accept the offer or opt out. In case of agreement, the pie is shared according to the proposal
and the game then proceeds to the next period. Otherwise, the negotiation is terminated
2To our knowledge only Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006) have analyzed commitment problems
theoretically.
3see Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006)
10
and the states fight. In case of war, state A wins with probability p ∈ [0, 1] and state B with
probability 1−p, leading to future payoffs per period (pi− cA, 0) when A wins and (0, pi− cB)
when B wins, where ci represent the irreversible costs of war. Consequently, the expected
values of the outside options are wA1−δ =
p(pi−cA)
1−δ and
wB
1−δ =
(1−p)(pi−cB)
1−δ with δ ∈ [0, 1] being
the states’ common discount factor. Obviously, the two states have an incentive to reach an
agreement if cA + cB ≥ 0. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the game tree:
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Lemma 1 In any subgame perfect equilibrium of the basic model, agreement is always reached
and the equilibrium outcome is therefore Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let (MA,MB) be the expected payoffs to A and B in a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game, or correspondingly any subgame starting with a move of nature. Let MminA ≤
MA ≤ MmaxA and MminB ≤ MB ≤ MmaxB be the corresponding interval for a specific set of
SPE outcomes of this game. Then wA+wB1−δ ≤MA +MB ≤ pi1−δ . Since the aggregate payoff in
case of agreement in period t is always bigger than the war payoff, wA+wB1−δ ≤ pi+δ(MA+MB),
war can occur only if the whole pie pi (xi = 0) is too small to meet the expectations of the
opponent,
pi + δM−i <
w−i
1− δ . (1.1)
However, Mmin−i ≥ αw−i1−δ + (1 − α)w−i1−δ = w−i1−δ since the opponent can always respond by
choosing the outside option, and if he gets to make an offer, additionally extract potential
efficiency gains in the current period and therefore expects to get at least his own outside
option payoff. This, however, is in contradiction to Equation (1.1)
pi + δ
w−i
1− δ ≤ pi + δM−i <
w−i
1− δ
as long as pi ≥ w−i.
Thus, in any subgame perfect equilibrium the equilibrium offer is always accepted and
either makes the respondend indifferent between acceptance and war or provides the respon-
dend with the minimal value (x∗i = pi) in which case the outside option is not binding.
Figure 1.2 below depicts different regions of the player’s proposals depending on whether or
not the outside options are binding. Theorem 1 caracterizes all subgame perfect equilibria.
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Theorem 1 The equilibrium offers depend on the relative size of the outside options wA and
wB:
x∗A = pi and x
∗
B = pi (case 1)
x∗A =
δ
1−δ (α(pi − wB)− (1− α)wA) and x∗B = δ1−δ ((1− α)(pi − wA)− αwB) (case 2)
x∗A = pi and x
∗
B =
pi−wA
1−δα (case 3)
x∗A =
pi−wB
1−δ(1−α) and x
∗
B = pi (case 4)
Proof. In case 1 (wA ≤ δαpi and wB ≤ δ(1−α)pi) both outside options are not binding since
both players can claim the whole pie in all future periods and therefore have no incentive to
end peaceful settlement. The respondend is better off accepting the minimal offer peacefully
and hoping for future peaceful returns.
In case 3 (δαpi < wA and wB ≤ δ(1−α)1−δα (pi − wA)) player A’s outside option is binding even
though he can claim the whole pie when he gets to make an offer in the future (x∗B < pi). Player
B’s expected payoff, if it is her turn to accept the offer, must satisfy wB1−δ ≤ (pi−x∗A)+δM t+1B .
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In any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if her outside option is not binding (A can
extract the whole surplus, xA = pi) then
wB
1− δ ≤ δMB =
(1− α)xB
1− δ and
wA
1− δ = pi − xB + δMA. (1.2)
pi − xB + δMA = pi − xB + δαpi + (1− α)(pi − xB)
1− δ =
1− δα
1− δ (pi − xB) + δαpi
x∗B =
pi − wA
1− δα and wB ≤ δ(1− α)x
∗
B
Case 4 ( wA ≤ δα1−δ(1−α)(pi − wB) and δ(1 − α)pi < wB) and is analogous to case 3 with the
roles of player A and B reversed.
Case 2 ( δα1−δ(1−α)(pi − wB) < wA and δ(1−α)1−δα (pi − wA) < wB), in which the size of net utility
gained by peaceful settlement is not sufficient to cover the outside option payoff, describes
all other conditions not covered in cases 1, 3 and 4, which implies that both outside options
become binding.
wA
1− δ = (pi − xB) +
δ
1− δ (αxA + (1− α)(pi − xB))
wB
1− δ = (pi − xA) +
δ
1− δ (α(pi − xA) + (1− α)xB)
has the unique solution
x∗A =
δ
1− δ (α(pi − wB)− (1− α)wA) and x
∗
B =
δ
1− δ ((1− α)(pi − wA)− αwB)
Given the optimal proposals defined by Theorem 1, the player’s expected payoffs in any
period are given by:
14
M∗A =

αpi in case 1
α(pi − wB) + (1− α)wA in case 2
(1−δ)piα+(1−α)wA
1−δα in case 3
α(pi−wB)
1−δ(1−α) in case 4
M∗B =

(1− α)pi in case 1
αwB + (1− α)(pi − wA) in case 2
(1−α)(pi−wA)
1−δα in case 3
(1−δ)(1−α)pi+αwB
1−δ(1−α) in case 4
1.3 Commitment Problems
Now we assume that the game tree is extended to include an additional stage t = 0 after which
the players’ relative bargaining position changes. This change, beginning at t = 1, lasts for
all periods to come and is fully expected by both players at the start of period t = 0 but not
before. Note that every period of the extended game, from period t = 1 on, is strategically
equivalent and equilibrium payoffs are determined by Theorem 1. In the following, we will
only consider changes in the relative bargaining position in favor of player B. This means
that player A’s bargaining position deteriorates either because his military power decreases,
his costs of war increase, B’s costs of war decrease or he loses proposal power. Suppose player
B has no other means to buy off player A in the current period but to give him the entire
pie, so that x0B = 0.
Again, collective reasoning supports peaceful settlement. Player A has no incentive to
trigger war because war would make him worse off than demanding the maximum acceptable
share, since
x∗A + δM
1
A <
w0A
1− δ , when pi − x
∗
A + δM
1
B =
w0B
1− δ
⇒ pi + δ(M1A +M1B) = pi + δ
pi
1− δ <
w0A + w
0
B
1− δ in contradiction to w
0
A + w
0
B < pi.
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The same argument applies to player B who also prefers bargaining over fighting.
A commitment problem can arise in this situation if player player B cannot credibly
commit in t = 0 to not exploit her improved bargaining position in future periods.
1.3.1 Shift in military power
A shift in military power changes the states’ respective probabilities of winning war p and
1−p. When military power shifts in favor of B, A’s outside option decreases and B’s outside
option increases, since wA1−δ =
p(pi−cA)
1−δ increases in p and
wB
1−δ =
(1−p)(pi−cB)
1−δ decreases in p. This
change in the players’ outside options can create a shift in the relative bargaining position
if it alters the future distribution of the bargaining surplus. It can lead to preventive war
if player A’s current outside option exceeds his expected future gains from bargaining. The
war condition determines the critical value of w0A from which player A prefers going to war
to bargaining. That is,
w0A
1− δ > pi +
δ
1− δM
1
A (1.3)
Since the aggregate future bargaining payoff δ1−δM
1
A depends on the 4 cases defined by The-
orem 1, the war condition can be specified as follows:
case 1 :
w0A
1−δ > pi +
δ
1−δαpi
case 2 :
w0A
1−δ > pi +
δ
1−δ
(
α(pi − w1B) + (1− α)w1A
)
case 3 :
w0A
1−δ > pi +
δ
1−δ
(
α(1−δ)pi+(1−α)w1A
1−δα
)
case 4 :
w0A
1−δ > pi +
δ
1−δ
(
α(pi−w1B)
1−δ(1−α)
) (1.4)
In all cases but Case 1, the war condition depends on at least one player’s outside option.
This means that as long as Case 1 obtains in t = 0 and in t = 1, a shift in military power has
no effect on the distribution of the bargaining surplus and can therefore not be the cause of
preventive war. In all other cases, preventive war is possible and occurs if the war condition
is fulfilled.
Corollary 1 The fulfillment of the war condition decreases in α. It depends on the level of
α, how substantial a change in military power has to be to cause preventive war.
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Proof. The fulfillment of the war condition depends on A’s expected future bargaining payoff
MA. The bigger this payoff, the more he prefers bargaining over fighting. It can easily be
verified that MA increases in α in all 4 cases:
case 1 : ∂MA∂α =
δ
1−δpi > 0
case 2 : ∂MA∂α =
δ
1−δ
(
pi − (w1A + w1B)
)
> 0
case 3 : ∂MA∂α =
δ
(1−δα)2
(
pi − w1A
)
> 0
case 4 : ∂MA∂α =
δ
(1−δ(1−α))2
(
pi − w1B
)
> 0
To show that the level of α affects the change in military power necessary to cause preventive
war, we compare the limit cases α ∈ {0, 1} that are treated in Fearon (1995) and Powell
(2006) respectively. For α ∈ {0, 1}, the war condition looks as follows:4
α = 1 :
w0A
1−δ > pi +
δ
1−δ
(
pi − w1B
)
α = 0 :
w0A
1−δ > pi +
δw1A
1−δ
The first case, α = 1, coincides with Powell’s model in which a shift in military power
takes place and player A has all proposal power. This means that the players’ payoffs are
determined only by player B’s outside option because player A always offers player B her war
payoff and receives the residuum. Rearranging terms and subtracting
δw1A
1−δ from both sides of
the first inequality gives Powell’s general inefficiency condition:
w0A − δw1A > pi − δ(w1A + w1B) (1.5)
The second case, α = 0, coincides with Fearon’s model in which a shift in military power
takes place and player B has all proposal power. In this war condition, w1B is absent. When
player B always proposes, then the player’s payoffs are determined only by player A’s outside
option because player B always offers player A his war payoff and receives the residuum. In
4For α = 1, Cases 1 and 3 disappear and the war conditions for Cases 2 and 4 are identical. For
α = 0 Cases 1 and 4 disappear and the war conditions for Cases 2 and 3 are identical.
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this case, the war condition can be written as:
w0A − δw1A > pi − δpi (1.6)
Comparing Condition 1.5 with Condition 1.6, it follows that the shift in military power
necessary to trigger war, (left hand side of the conditions) is smaller for α = 0 than for α = 1
since pi > w1B.
The findings confirm the standard argument that a shift in military power can change the
relative bargaining position which can cause preventive war. But in contrast to Powell (2006)
who concludes that the shift in military power necessary to cause preventive war needs to be
“large and rapid”, we can show that the necessary shift depends on the parties’ respective
bargaining power. When the declining party has little bargaining power and can only extract
a small share of the bargaining surplus, then a smaller shift in military power is necessary to
trigger war. When α = 0, the necessary shift even goes to zero for δ → 1, as can be seen in
Condition 1.6.
1.3.2 Increase in A’s costs of war
An increase in A’s costs of war reduces A’s outside option since wA1−δ =
p(pi−cA)
1−δ decreases in
cA. It has no effect on player B’s outside option because
wB
1−δ =
(1−p)(pi−cB)
1−δ does not depend
on cA. A reduction in player A’s outside option can create a shift in the relative bargaining
position if it alters the future distribution of the bargaining surplus and lead to preventive
war if player A’s current outside option exceeds his expected future gains from bargaining.
As long as Case 1 obtains in t = 0 or Case 4 obtains in t = 0, an increase in A’s costs of
war has no effect on surplus distribution because equilibrium offers do not depend on wA. In
any other case, an increase in A’s costs of war changes the distribution of surplus and leads
to preventive war if the war condition is fulfilled.
It is easy to verify that the war condition for the case of a shift in military power and the
case of an increase in player A’s costs of war is identical when w1B is not binding (Cases 1
and 3 in t = 1), because the war condition in Cases 1 and 3 does not depend on B’s outside
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option w1B.
In Cases 2 and 4, the war condition depends on w1B. In these cases, it makes a difference
whether a change in military power causes A’s decline or an increase in his costs of war. A
cost increase only affects A’s outside option while a shift in military power not only reduces
A’s outside option but at the same time increases B’s outside option which further reduces
A’s expected future gains from bargaining.
The finding that bargaining can break down not only because of a change in military
power but also because of an isolated increase in one state’s costs of war is novel and has
not yet been acknowledged in the formal literature on war initiation. Increased costs of war
can result if, for example, one state intends to take measures to direct the blame of potential
war to the adversary and secure diplomatic support. If this were the case, a shift in military
power would not take place but still the adversary would expect to sustain a reduction in his
outside option and possibly go to war in order to prevent this.
Next, we will present two cases of shifts in the relative bargaining position which, in
contrast to military power shifts and costs increases, do not result in the breakdown of
bargaining.
1.3.3 Decrease in B’s costs of war
A decrease in player B’s costs of war increases her outside option because wB1−δ =
(1−p)(pi−cB)
1−δ
decreases in cB. This leads to a shift in the relative bargaining position in Cases 2 and 4
because in theses cases, equilibrium offers depend on wB. However, even though A’s future
payoff deteriorates, he has no incentive to opt out because his outside option wA1−δ =
p(pi−cA)
1−δ
is independent of cB.
Corollary 2 If player A’s outside option remains constant, so that w0A = w
1
A, then war is
not an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Player A has no reason to opt for war in t = 0 because
pi + δM1A ≥ pi + δ
w1A
1− δ >
w0A
1− δ
for w0A = w
1
A < pi.
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Notice that this result contradicts the standard argument that a shift in the player’s
respective bargaining position can by itself be enough to make war a rational possibility.
Here, the relative bargaining position of player B can improve at the cost of diminished
expected gains for player A, without involving inefficient outcomes.
The analysis concludes with the verification that changes in proposal power can also not
be the cause of bargaining breakdowns.
1.3.4 Shift in proposal power
A shift in proposal power changes the players’ relative bargaining position in all cases because
equilibrium offers always depend on α. A negative shift in proposal power reduces player A’s
expected future bargaining payoff MA and thus also positively affects the fulfillment of the
war condition as shown in corollary 2. However, a negative shift in proposal power alone
cannot cause preventive war because player A’s outside option does not decrease. This
follows immediately from Corollary 2.
Corollary 3 A reduction in player A’s proposal power does not lead to war.
1.4 Conclusion
Our model specifies the concept of commitment problems in international bargaining. We
provide two main results. First, we show that a negative shift in the relative bargaining
position problems does not necessarily lead to preventive war under commitment. Both, a
decrease in one party’s costs of war and a loss of proposal power affect the parties’ relative
bargaining position, and can diminish a party’s gains, but interestingly, cannot lead to pre-
ventive war. Second, we find that in addition to shifts in military power, increased costs of
war can also result in preventive war under commitment problems.
This analysis builds the formal groundwork for preventive war arguments. It also allows
conjectures about the role of third party intervention in international conflicts because it
clarifies what kinds of power shifts between nations can actually induce preventive war. The
model predicts that both economic (reduced costs of war) and military (higher probability
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of winning war) support can improve a party’s bargaining position, while only military in-
tervention can cause preventive war if it triggers a shift in the winning probabilities and/or
increases the opponent’s costs of war.
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Chapter 2
Note on the Equilibrium in a
Rubinstein-type Bargaining Game
with Random Proposers and
Two-Sided Outside Options
Abstract
This note characterizes equilibrium behavior in a Rubinstein-type bargaining game with the
possibility of counteroffers, random proposers and outside options and compares its unique
SPE with the stationary SPE of the repeated bargaining game with take-it-or-leave-it offers
presented in Chapter 1. It is shown that both games generate identical SPE payoffs. Since
the war condition in Chapter 1 critically depends on the declining state’s future payoff, all
results carry over to the one-time bargaining case discussed here.
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2.1 Introduction
If a player’s bargaining power is captured by her share of the surplus, then beginning with
the seminal work by Rubinstein (1982), bargaining literature has identified three independent
key sources of bargaining power: the ability to propose an allocation, the ability to wait
for agreement and the ability to quit the negotiation. The ability to wait, represented by
the discount factor is an important element in the original model, indicating “shrinking
cakes”. It also has the appealing feature of conveying bargaining power through the players’
respective valuation of time. The bargaining power resulting from the possibility of leaving
the negotiation table permanently has first been analyzed by Shaked and Sutton (1984) and
further explored in the works of Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989) and Ponsat´ı and Sa´kovics
(1998). Proposal power on the other hand has long been considered the less attractive feature
of the alternating offer protocol which conveys an undesired advantage to moving first.
The one-time bargaining model studied here is a variation of the Rubinstein alternating
offer game with two-sided outside options. The alternating offer protocol is substituted with
random determination of the proposer in each negotiation round. This constitutes a game
in which all three sources of bargaining power - proposal power, discount factor and outside
option - are variables. I find that this game has a unique equilibium and that the players’
expected payoffs in this equilibrium coincide with the expected per period payoffs of the game
in Chapter 1 which features infinitely repeated interaction but no counter offers. Because the
expected payoffs are the same in both games and the analysis of changes in bargaining power
depends on expected payoffs, all the results presented in Section 1.4 carry over to this game.
2.2 The Model
Negotiators A (he) and B (she) bargain about the distribution of an issue of size pi > 0. Be-
fore the negotiation starts, each player’s proposal power is determined exogenously. Proposal
power is measured by a fixed variable α ∈ (0, 1). More specifically, α determines the proba-
bility that player A can make a proposal on the distribution in the current period. Players A
and B discount future payoffs with a common discount factor 0 < δ < 1. A player’s proposal
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is denoted xti ∀ t ∈ (0,∞) where xti refers to the share of the pie that player i receives in
this period. A player can respond to a proposal in three different ways: accept the offer,
reject the offer and make a counteroffer or opt out. In case of agreement, the pie is shared
according to the proposal and the game ends. When the responder opts out, both players get
their respective outside option payoffs wA and wB and the game ends. The game continues
until one player accepts the other’s proposal or opts out. In case of perpetual disagreement
each player’s payoff is zero. Consequently, player A’s and B’s expected utilities are defined
as
utA = αx
t
A + (1− α)(pi − xtB)
utB = α(pi − xtA) + (1− α)xtB
in any subgame, in which both players accept.
Figure 2.1 below illustrates the game tree:
Proposition 1 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the one-time bargaining model
with random proposers and outside options, agreement is reached at t = 0 and the SPE is
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Pareto efficient. Proposals are determined as follows:
• player A always proposes x∗A, always accepts an offer pi − xB if and only if xB ≤ x∗B
and always opts out if and only if wA > δ(αx
∗
A + (1− α)(pi − x∗B))
• player B always proposes x∗B, always accepts an offer pi − xA if and only if xA ≤ x∗A
and always opts out if and only if wB > δ(α(pi − x∗A) + (1− α)x∗B), where
x∗A =

(1− δ (1− α))pi if wA ≤ δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1− α)pi (case 1)
pi − wB if wA > δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 2)
(1−δ)pi+δ(1−α)wA
1−δα if wA > δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 3)
pi − wB if wA ≤ δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1− α)pi (case 4)
x∗B =

(1− δα)pi if wA ≤ δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1− α)pi (case 1)
pi − wA if wA > δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 2)
pi − wA if wA > δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 3)
(1−δ)pi+αδwB
1−δ(1−α) if wA ≤ δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1− α)pi (case 4)
Given these optimal proposals, the player’s expected payoffs are exactly the same as the
expected payoffs that result in any period in the repeated game with take-it-or-leave-it offers,
given the optimal proposals defined by Theorem 1:1
u∗A =

αpi if wA ≤ δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1− α)pi (case 1)
α(pi − wB) + (1− α)wA if wA > δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 2)
(1−δ)piα+(1−α)wA
1−δα if wA > δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 3)
α(pi−wB)
1−δ(1−α) if wA ≤ δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1− α)pi (case 4)
1see p.13, Chapter 1
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u∗B =

(1− α)pi if wA ≤ δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1− α)pi (case 1)
αwB + (1− α)(pi − wA) if wA > δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 2)
(1−α)(pi−wA)
1−δα if wA > δαpi ∩ wB ≤ δ(1−α)(pi−wA)1−δα (case 3)
(1−δ)(1−α)pi+αwB
1−δ(1−α) if wA ≤ δα(pi−wB)1−δ(1−α) ∩ wB > δ(1− α)pi (case 4)
Proof. In any SPE that satisfies the properties of stationarity and no-delay player i is
indifferent between accepting and not accepting player j’s equilibrium offer. That is
pi − x∗A = max{δ (α(pi − x∗A) + (1− α)x∗B) , wB}
pi − x∗B = max{δ(αx∗A + (1− α)(pi − x∗B)), wA}
The unique solution to these equations is stated in the proposition. Since the solution is
unique there exists at most one SPE satisfying the properties of stationarity and no-delay.
It is easy to verify that there does not exist another subgame perfect equilibrium by exploiting
the stationary stucture that underlies the random-proposer game: any two subgames have
an identical stragetic structure which means that the sets of SPE payoffs to each player in
any two SPE are identical. Showing that the maximum and minimum values of the payoff
sets are identical leads to the conclusion that the payoffs to each player in any two SPE are
identical. Let Mi denote the supremum and mi the infimum of equilibrium payoffs to player
i in any subgame. The following must hold:
mA ≥ pi −max{δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) , wB} (2.1)
MA ≤ pi −max{δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) , wB} (2.2)
mB ≥ pi −max{δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB)) , wA} (2.3)
MB ≤ pi −max{δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB)) , wA} (2.4)
Inequality (2.1) follows from the fact that, in equilibrium, player B must accept any offer
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xA with pi − xA > max{δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) , wB} because the right-hand side is the
most that she can get from either refusing or opting out. Thus, in equilibrium player A
cannot get less than xA, where xA < pi−max{δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) , wB}, because he
can always guarantee xA by making xA his offer.
Inequality (2.2) follows from the fact that, in equilibrium, player B must get at least xB,
for each xB < max{δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) , wB} because xB can be guaranteed ei-
ther by refusing player A’s offer or by opting out. Hence player A can get at most pi −
max{δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) , wB} in equilibrium. Inequalities (2.3) and (2.4) are just
the same, but with the roles of players A and B reversed.
9 cases need to be distinguished:
1. wB ≤ δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) ∩ wA ≤ δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB))
2. wB > δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) ∩ wA > δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB))
3. wB ≤ δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) ∩ wA > δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB))
4. wB > δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) ∩ wA ≤ δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB))
5. δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) < wB ≤ δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) ∩
wA ≤ δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB))
6. δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) < wB ≤ δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) ∩
wA > δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB))
7. δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB)) < wA ≤ δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB)) ∩
wB ≤ δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB)
8. δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB)) < wA ≤ δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB)) ∩
wB > δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB)
9. δ (α(pi −MA) + (1− α)mB) < wB ≤ δ (α(pi −mA) + (1− α)MB) ∩
δ (αmA + (1− α)(pi −MB)) < wA ≤ δ (αMA + (1− α)(pi −mB))
For cases 1−4, equilibrium offers and payoffs can be uniquely defined as stated in Proposition
1. Cases 5− 9 lead to contradictions.
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2.3 Conclusion
The note defines the unique equilibrium in a Rubinstein-type bargaining game with the
possibility of counteroffers, random proposers and two-sided outside options. It shows that
the equilibrium payoffs are the same as in the structurally different game in Chapter 1 in
which the base game is infinitely repeated, counteroffers are excluded and the players only
have the choice between acceptance and opting out.
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Chapter 3
Crisis Bargaining, Democracy and
the Transparency Argument
Abstract
Transparency, along with accountability of democratic representatives, has long been iden-
tified as a key component of democratic peace. The paper shows how these two arguments
interact and facilitate democratic peace in a simple game-theoretic model. Based on this
analysis, I investigate how the level of transparency within the principal-agent relationship of
a democratic public and its elected leader affects the crisis bargaining outcome and whether
more transparency and accountability always translates into better results for the democratic
public.
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3.1 Introduction
Democratic peace refers to the very stable empirical observation that democracies rarely go
to war with one another, but are not immune from fighting wars with non-democracies.1
The present paper is a contribution to the game-theoretic literature which aims to explain
democratic peace with informational advantages of democracies.2 This strand of literature
originated in Fearon’s (1994) famous paper on audience costs and highlights the importance
of successful signaling in eliminating miscommunications between democracies that may oth-
erwise lead states to miscalculate the willingness of the opponent to fight over an issue.
Audience costs theory claims that democracies are better able to signal their intentions
because democratic leaders incur audience costs if they make threats that they later fail to
follow through. In contrast, statements of politically unaccountable dictators are considered
to lack that source of credibility because they are able to bluff without facing domestic costs.
Despite the prominence of audience costs theory (Snyder and Borghard (2011) count over
400 references in scholarly journals), the actual relevance of audience costs in real world crisis
bargaining could not be verified in empirical studies.3 Also, Snyder and Borghard point out
that, in historic cases, public threats are rarely unambiguous which prevents leaders to be
held fully accountable for failed threats and the audience costs argument to unfold. Weeks
(2008), on the other hand, argues that democracies need not be unique in their ability to
raise audience costs. She identifies various sources of audience costs in autocracies and, on
these grounds, concludes that a signaling advantage for democratic leaders based on audience
costs does not exist.
Numerous scholars have since followed the signaling approach and added new arguments
to the pool of reasons why democracies are able to signal successfully. Smith (1998) and
Guisinger and Smith (2002) include democratic politics and endogenize the credibility of a
threat to the leadership selection process, in the attempt to provide a rational underpinning as
to why domestic audiences punish leaders who back down from a threat. Schultz (1998) takes
the public behavior of an informed opposition into account, assuming that the opposition’s
1see for example Oneal and Russett (1997) and Maoz and Abdolali (1989)
2for a critical appreciation of democratic peace theory see Rosato (2003)
3for an overview of empirical studies on audience costs see Gartzke and Lupu (2012)
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rhetoric qualifies as a credible signaling device. Ramsay (2004) elaborates the domestic
opposition angle showing that the opposition’s endorsement of the leader can work as a
costly signal in crisis bargaining and eliminate information asymmetries.
In this study, I take one step back and show that democracies do not require a costly sig-
naling device to credibly convey their intentions but that transparency (within democracies)
and accountability (of democratic representatives) is sufficient. More specifically, when politi-
cal leaders care sufficiently about reelection, they are ready to align their private interest with
that of the public, and because public interests are in fact quite public in democracies, the
opponent knows what to expect from a democracy, leading to the phenomenon of democratic
peace in the dyadic case.
This approach simplifies the analysis because it is not build around a signaling device and
thus creates room to address another important question that has usually been investigated
in separate articles and separate models but is essentially related: The question of what level
of transparency is optimal within the agency relationship between the political leader and the
voters. Especially, why is crisis bargaining sometimes completely public while other times
happening behind closed doors, and how does that affect the crisis bargaining outcome.
With that respect, I distinguish between two kinds of transparency: First, a general
kind of transparency, including freedom of speech, free press and media, is the reason why
all parties involved in crisis bargaining share the same information about the democratic
majority’s preferences. Second, by agency transparency, I mean the ability of the principal
to observe the agent’s behavior and its consequences.
The paper has two objectives: First, it is to provide a simple game-theoretic foundation
of the most prevalent arguments for democratic peace: transparency and accountability.4
Second, it is to analyze what degree of agency transparency is preferable in an international
bargaining setting by comparing two scenarios, open-door bargaining in which the democratic
public can observe the bargaining process between its representative and a third party and
closed-door bargaining, in which the agent’s actions are partly hidden.
I find that imperfect information can have two effects. Firstly and predictably, it can
worsen the agent’s accountability and increase his incentive to follow his own preferences
4see Schultz (1999)
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instead of the principal’s which reduces the predictability of democracies and can increase
the probability of a bargaining breakdown. But secondly and interestingly, less information
and less accountability can also increase the opponent’s offer and lead to better outcomes for
the democratic public.
The idea that revealing more information may not always be beneficial is fairly new and
departs from earlier research proclaiming that agency relationships should be as transparent
as possible because transparency improves accountability.5 Recent studies on career concern
models suggest that in some circumstances, transparency may have detrimental effects if it
leads to inefficient posturing. Prat (2005) employs a quite general model of career concerns for
experts in which the agent’s type determines his ability to understand the state of the world
and finds that more transparency has a negative effect if it induces the agent to disregard
useful private signals and to act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori.
The present paper is closer related to Stasavage (2004) who assumes that the public is
uncertain about a representative’s preferences instead of his ability. He also finds that more
transparency and less difficulty in inferring a representative’s type has the negative effect
that unbiased representatives have more incentive to ignore their private signal (about the
opponent’s minimum acceptable offer) and posture. Stasavage concludes that because pos-
turing is the unique equilibrium under open-door bargaining as long as reputational concerns
are sufficiently strong, “one should expect to see more uncompromising positions taken dur-
ing open-door bargaining, greater polarization of debate, and more frequent breakdowns in
bargaining than would otherwise be the case.”(Stasavage 2004)
In the present paper, however, a negative effect from posturing cannot arise because
there is no private signal (about the opponent’s minimal offer) that could be neglected and
posturing is never beneficial for unbiased agents. But even with the negative posturing
effect under open-door bargaining missing, I find that closed-door bargaining can generate
comparatively better results for the democratic public if it induces the opponent to increase
his offer. This is why democracies may sometimes prefer closed-door bargaining even though
it includes a higher risk of bargaining breakdown.
5see Holmstro¨m (1999)
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3.2 The Classical Crisis Bargaining Approach
Two parties, A and B, bargain about the distribution of an issue of size 1. Each player has
an individual outside option wi, which is private information. For simplification, I assume
that one of the bargainers is selected at random to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which the
opponent accepts if and only if this offer meets at least her outside option wi. Otherwise, she
opts out and both parties receive their respective outside option payoffs.
This modeling correlates to the literature on war bargaining that often treats war as
a costly lottery which is won by party A with probability φA ∈ [0, 1] and party B with
probability φB = 1 − φA. The expected gains from this lottery can be interpreted as the
parties’ respective outside options wi = φi− ci of the bargining game, where ci represent the
costs of war. Note that, in this formulation, the term ci captures the relative net value that
a party places on winning or losing the war. That is, ci reflects party i’s costs of war relative
to any possible benefits. In practice, low costs of war translate into a high outside option or
high resolve, which means that the issue at stake is highly valued and going to war a viable
option at relatively small costs. On the other hand, if a party sees little to gain from winning
war, then ci would be large even if the actual costs, incurred by war, were small.
6
War can occur when there is asymmetric information about the opponent’s resolve. When
the opponent can either have a high outside option (high resolve) or a low outside option
(low resolve), a state may have an incentive to screen the opponent’s type and make an offer
which is only acceptable to the weak type, leading to war whenever the opponent is strong.
Asymmetric information about the opponent’s outside option either means that the par-
ties have private information about the probability to win a war, which basically refers to
military ressources, or private information about the costs of war, which will be applied here.
As stated above, high costs of war immediately result in a low outside option and low costs
of war in a high outside option.
The asymmetry in information is modeled as follows: From A’s point of view, player B’s
outside option is low (wlB) with probability 0 < β < 1 and high (w
h
B ) with probability 1−β,
with wlB < w
h
B. Equally, player B believes that A’s outside option is low (weak type) with
6see Fearon (1995)
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probability 0 < α < 1 and high (strong type) with probability 1− α. In contrast to the case
of asymmetric information about military resources, in the case of asymmetric information
about costs, a mutually beneficial bargaining outcome always exists, even when two strong
types negotiate, whA + w
h
B ≤ 1.
The conditions for war are as follows:
Conditions for War
1. A makes a screening offer x = wlB if β(1− wlB) + (1− β)wiA > 1− whB
2. B makes a screening offer x = wlA if α(1− wlA) + (1− α)wiB > 1− whA
Condition 1 states that it is optimal for player A given his type wiA with w
i
A ∈ {wlA, whA}
to make a screening offer. A screening offer (left hand side) gives him a profit of 1 − wlB
with probability β which is the probability that B is weak and will accept a low offer wlB.
With probability 1 − β, however, B is strong and refuses to accept such low offer. In this
case, war occurs and A obtains his outside option wiA. A pooling offer (right hand side) is
accepted by weak and strong types and is thus a riskless profit for the proposer. Condition
2 essentially states the same with the roles of the players reversed. Generally, when a state
makes a screening offer, the probability of war is positive and equals the probability that the
opponent is strong. Making a screening offer is less attractive for weak types because they
have a low outside option and therefore a smaller expected profit from making such offer
compared to strong types. For example, when B makes the offer, then the critical threshold
(minimum α) from which a screening offer is optimal for both types is given by
α
′′
=
1− whA − whB
1− wlA − whB
The critical threshold from which screening is optimal for the strong but not the weak type
is given by
α
′
=
1− whA − wlB
1− wlA − wlB
with α
′
< α
′′
. It follows that
(a) for α ≤ α′ , both types prefer a pooling offer.
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(b) for α
′
< α ≤ α′′ , the weak type prefers a pooling and the strong type a screening offer.
(c) for α
′′
< α, both types prefer a screening offer.
A further illustration of the war condition is given in Figure 3.1 which depicts A’s optimal
offer to B where β˜ =
1−whB−wiA
1−wlB−wiA
is the critical β from which A prefers to make a screening
offer.
3.3 Extension of the Classical Approach
As an extension of the classical war bargaining approach, I take into account individual
preferences regarding war within a state. I assume that not everyone in one state shares
the same preferences regarding war but that these preferences differ. More specifically, there
may be people who suffer high private costs in case of war, i.e. soldiers who do the actual
fighting or pacifists who oppose the concept of war in general. On the other hand, there may
be people who have much lower costs associated with war, either because they highly value
the issue at stake or because their personal costs of war are much smaller, i.e. people who
work in the arms industry.
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Additionally, I follow in the steps of Fearon (1994), Jackson and Morelli (2007) and many
others by assuming that states feature a principal-agent relationship with the agent being
the political leader who engages in a crisis bargaining game with a third party on behalf of
his principal, the people. While both regime types share this characteristic, the difference
between democracy and autocracy is that the revelation of the principal’s preferences is
private in autocracies but public in democracies.7 It is this general transparency within
democracies that facilitates signaling to the opponent.
However, within the framework of this model, this transparency does not necessarily
translate into efficient signaling if the agent’s preferences (regarding resolve for war) differ
from majority’s preferences. Since, as opposed to classical principal-agent literature, in the
context of political institutions, the principal cannot make a specific incentive compatible
contract to induce the right behavior in the agent but can only elect and dismiss, the agent
may still not be completely deterred from following his own and not majority’s preferences
even under perfect information. The problem intensifies when information is imperfect and
the agent’s action cannot be fully observed by the principal.
What is also interesting to note is that even though revealing weak resolve to the oppo-
nent through signaling cannot be in the principal’s best interest, otherwise there would be
no reason to conceal the type and no grounds for miscommunications in the first place, the
conclusion that successful signaling provides democracies with more peaceful yet disadvan-
tageous bargaining outcomes turns out to be wrong. Although there are situations in which
revealing a weak type through signaling has negative effects on the bargaining share, I will
show that there are also situations in which democracies are offered comparably higher shares
than autocracies in a similar position despite the public signal revealing a weak type.
The reason for this lies within the principal-agent relationship. Although the signal
about majority’s preferences is public, the opponent does not know from the outset how a
democratic leader will react in the bargaining game because the leader’s type is still private
information. Since the public’s control over the agent is limited to removing him from office,
7In accordance with Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), I suppose that one decisive difference between
democracy and autocracy is the size of the winning coalition, where the winning coalition subsumes
all “people whose support is required to keep the incumbent in office” and is typically large in a
democracy, while small in autocracies. Because the winning coalition is small in autocracies, I argue
that the political leader can learn the principal’s preferences privately while in a democracy he cannot.
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and agents may be more interested in obtaining their preferable bargaining outcome than
being reelected, agents may still defect from majority’s preferences even if their actions can
be monitored. In order to satisfy such biased agents, the opponent may be ready to offer more
than he would to an autocracy. This will be discussed in Section 3.5.1 Open-door bargaining
and used as a reference case for Section 3.5.2 Closed-door bargaining. Under closed-door
bargaining, the public can monitor the agent’s choice of action imperfectly. But even though
imperfect information worsens the agent’s accountability and increases his incentive to follow
his own preferences, which counteracts successful signaling, there are situations in which less
information and less accountability leads to better outcomes for the democratic public.
3.4 The Model
Suppose there is a democratic state involved in crisis bargaining with another state, denoted
O (opponent, which can either be a democratic or an autocratic state). Let A denote the
leader (agent) of a democracy and P the democratic majority (principal). In the bargaining
game, A decides what offer to make to the opponent and what offer to accept, and majority
decides if the leader will remain in office afterwards.
The leader cares about the bargaining outcome as well as getting reelected. In the bar-
gaining game he decides whether to act in the principal’s interest (unbiased) or his own
interest (biased). The principal has two types, w ∈ {wl, wh} depending on the democratic
majority’s preferences, where majority is weak (wl) with probability β and strong (wh) with
probability 1 − β. Majority’s type becomes known immediately to the agent and the oppo-
nent through a public signal. As any other individual in the democracy, the agent has two
types that differ in their preferences, he is either wl with probability β or wh with probability
1− β, which is private information. I assume that the public is not interested in the agent’s
type but in his action. In the election that follows crisis bargaining, the voter’s concern is
to reelect an agent that acted unbiased and replace an agent that acted biased. The reason
for this assumption is that the bargaining issue is not a constant but subject to change so
that in the next bargaining case the leader’s preferences may be unaligned with majority’s
preferences. With this in mind, the voter is better off making his reelection decision based
37
on the leader’s action and not dismiss leaders who act in the public’s interest.
For simplicity, I assume that the public’s reelection decision is an increasing function of the
public’s belief that the representative acted unbiased u according to the public’s preference,
given the bargaining outcome θ, Pr(u | θ).8
The payoff to the agent is then given by
UA = λθ(wA) + (1− λ)Pr(u | θ)
with wA ∈ {wl, wh}, where λ measures the weight agents put on the bargaining outcome
and 1 − λ the weight, they put on reputational concerns. The agent’s value of reelection is
normalized to 1.
The payoff to the principal is a monotonic increasing function of the bargaining outcome and
depends on his outside option wP , with wP ∈ {wl, wh}: UP (θ(wP )).
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Nature determines preferences.
2. Public signal about principal’s type.
3. Agent chooses whether to act biased or unbiased.
4. Bargaining game: Upon random selection, either the opponent O or the agent A makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer which is either accepted or rejected.
5. Public either observes bargaining outcome and process (under open-door bargaining) or
merely the bargaining outcome (under closed-door bargaining), and infers the agent’s
choice of action.
6. A receives payoff based on the bargaining outcome and the public’s inferences (posterior
of A’s choice).
8See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) for a similar approach and review of the literature on agents
with career concerns.
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Because the signal about the principal’s type is private in autocracies, signaling is not
possible for an autocracy within the framework of this model. The propensity of war in the
Autocracy/Autocracy case therefore coincides with that predicted by classical crisis bargain-
ing models as presented in Section 3.2. In the following equilibrium analysis I will distinguish
between the Democracy/Autocracy case in which the opponent is an autocracy and the
Democracy/Democracy case in which the opponent is also a democracy.
3.5 Equilibrium Analysis
Note that agents whose preferences are aligned with the principal’s preferences have every
incentive to act in the principal’s interest because otherwise they would incur a payoff loss
in terms of bargaining outcome and in terms of reputation. The following conditions ensure
that agents whose preferences differ from the principal’s act in the principal’s interest when
democracy responds to an offer:
Weak Agent
If wP = wh the weak agent has different preferences than the principal. In order to act
unbiased he needs to be ready to reject an offer that is higher than his own outside option
but below the principal’s outside option. He rejects an offer wl ≤ x < wh as long as
λx+ (1− λ)Pr(u | x) ≤ λwl + (1− λ)Pr(u | war) (3.1)
⇔ λ ≤ Pr(u | war)− Pr(u | x)
Pr(u | war)− Pr(u | x) + x− wl
The weak type is ready to reject an offer that is higher than his outside option if reputational
concerns (1−λ) are high. In this case, he is ready to accept personal costs from the bargaining
outcome, which is going to war despite high personal costs of war, because these costs are
offset by higher reputation which also creates utility.
Note that Pr(u | war) and Pr(u | x) ∈ {0, 1} under open-door bargaining when the
principal can observe the entire bargaining process but that Pr(u | war) and Pr(u | x) may
well assume values between 0 and 1 under closed-door bargaining when the principal can
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merely observe the bargaining outcome.
Strong Agent
If wP = wl the strong agent has different preferences than the principal. In order to act
unbiased he needs to be ready to accept an offer that is below his own outside option but
higher than the principal’s outside option. The strong agent accepts wl ≤ x < wh if:
λwh + (1− λ)Pr(u | war) ≤ λx+ (1− λ)Pr(u | x) (3.2)
⇔ λ ≤ Pr(u | x)− Pr(u | war)
Pr(u | x)− Pr(u | war) + wh − x
When the condition holds, the strong agent prefers accepting wl over rejecting it because
his reputational gains outweigh his personal costs from accepting an offer below his outside
option.
3.5.1 Open-door bargaining
When the bargaining process is completely transparent, the game is one of perfect informa-
tion. The only reason why signaling in the bargaining game might fail would be that the
biased agent values the bargaining outcome so much that he is not restrained from acting
on his own preferences despite negative reputation effects. Under open-door bargaining, the
public can exactly discern whose turn it is to make an offer and what the offer looks like. It
follows that the public is certain about whether the agent acted unbiased or biased. For the
two subgames, the principal’s assessment is as follows:
1. When the opponent makes the offer and the agent responds:
• If wP = wl then Pr(u | x ≥ wl) = Pr(u | war, x < wl) = 1 and Pr(u | war, x ≥
wl) = 0.
• If wP = wh then Pr(u | x ≥ wh) = Pr(u | war, x < wh) = 1 and Pr(u | x <
wh) = 0.
2. When the agent makes the offer and the opponent responds:
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• If the principal prefers a pooling offer xp then Pr(u | x = 1 − xp) = 1 and
Pr(u | x 6= 1− xp) = 0.
• If the principal prefers a screening offer xs then Pr(u | x = 1 − xs) = 1 and
Pr(u | x 6= 1− xs) = 0.
Democracy/Autocracy
I will first look at the case, that the opponent is an autocracy, meaning a single actor with
an outside option wO ∈ {wl, wh}.
Democracy makes the offer
The democratic agent’s offer to the autocracy does not differ from the offer that an autoc-
racy would make in this position as long as democratic agents are sufficiently interested in
reelection. To see this, rememeber that the democratic principal is considered a unitary actor
with preferences wP ∈ {wl, wh}. Just as an autocracy, he prefers to make a screening offer
if the probability that the opponent is weak, α, is sufficiently high. The critical values for α
are the same as in the Autocracy/Autocracy case presented in Section 3.2. Note that when
α ≤ α′ , a pooling offer is optimal for both types and when α′′ < α both types prefer to make
a screening offer, so that there is no conflict of interest between the principal and the agent
independent of their types. However, when α
′
< α ≤ α′′ strong types prefer a screening offer
while weak types prefer a pooling offer which may create a conflict of interest.
When α
′
< α ≤ α′′ , the following conditions guarantee that the agent acts unbiased:
When wP = wh and wA = wl, the agent’s preferences differ from the principal’s. The weak
agent acts unbiased if:
λ(α(1−wlO)+(1−α)wlA)+(1−λ)Pr(u | x = 1−xs) ≥ λ(1−whO)+(1−λ)Pr(u | x 6= 1−xs)
For Pr(u | x = 1− xs) = 1 and Pr(u | x 6= 1− xs) = 0, the critical λ˜s that guarantees that
the weak agent acts unbiased is determined by
λ ≤ 1
1− whO + αwlO + (1− α)(1− wlA)
= λ˜s
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When wP = wl and wA = wh, the agent’s preferences differ from the principal’s. The strong
agent acts unbiased if:
λ(1−whO)+(1−λ)Pr(u | x = 1−xp) ≥ λ(α(1−wlO)+(1−α)whA)+(1−λ)Pr(u | x 6= 1−xp)
For Pr(u | x = 1− xp) = 1 and Pr(u | x 6= 1− xp) = 0, the critical λ˜p that guarantees that
the strong agent acts unbiased is determined by
λ ≤ 1
α(1− wlO) + (1− α)whA + whO
= λ˜p
Corollary 4 When bargaining is open-door and reputation is sufficiently important to biased
agents, so that λ ≤ min{λ˜s, λ˜p}, the optimal offer to an autocracy is independent of regime
type.
Because screening offers are made as frequently as in the Autocracy/Autocracy case, given
that reelection is important, the probability of war is also the same. That is why the fol-
lowing analysis concentrates on the offer that is accepted by the democracy because here the
equilibrium offer changes with regime type when reputation is important.
Democracy responds to an offer
When wP = wh, the unbiased agent will accept no offer x < wh. The opponent makes a
pooling offer x = wh, if he has no incentive to deviate to a screening offer acceptable only to
the weak agent. The following condition must hold:
1− wh ≥ β(1− x) + (1− β)wO (3.3)
The left hand side is the opponent’s payoff from making a high offer accepted by both
types and the right hand side is his payoff from making an offer x < wh that is accepted
with probability β (by the weak type) and rejected with probability 1 − β (by the strong
type) in which case war results leaving the opponent with his outside option wO. An offer
x < wh is acceptable to the weak agent if his incentive constraint, Condition 3.1, fails. For
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Pr(u | war, x < wh) = 1 and Pr(u | x < wh) = 0, that is if
x >
1
λ
+ wl − 1 = xh (3.4)
So xh defines the weak agent’s minimum acceptable offer. Let x
′
h define the maximum
screening offer the opponent is ready to make to the weak agent. It is determined by failure
of Condition 3.3:
x < 1− wO − 1− wO − wh
β
= x
′
h (3.5)
It follows from Conditions 3.4 and 3.5 that there is a screening equilibrium for xh < x
′
h in
which the opponent makes a screening offer x = max{wl, xh} that is accepted by the weak
type and rejected by the strong type, and there is a pooling equilibrium for xh ≥ x′h in which
the offer x = wh is accepted by both types of agent.
Let λ˜h define the maximum λ for which a pooling equilibrium exists. Then λ˜h is determined
by:
xh ≥ x′h
⇔ 1
λ
+ wl − 1 ≥ 1− wO − 1− wO − wh
β
⇔ λ ≤ β
(1− wl)β − (1− β)(1− wO) + wh = λ˜h (3.6)
For λ > λ˜h a screening equilibrium results.
If wP = wl, the opponent makes a pooling offer x ≥ wl acceptable to both types if his
payoff from making such an offer (right hand side of Condition 3.7 below) exceeds his payoff
from making a screening offer x = wl that is only accepted by the weak type (left hand side
of Condition 3.7):
β(1− wl) + (1− β)wO ≤ 1− x (3.7)
An offer wl ≤ x < wh is acceptable to both types of agent if the strong type’s incentive
constraint, Condition 3.2, holds. For Pr(u | war, x ≥ wl) = 0 and Pr(u | x ≥ wl) = 1, that
is if
x ≥ 1 + wh − 1
λ
= xl (3.8)
43
So xl defines the strong agent’s minimum acceptable offer. Let x
′
l define the maximum pooling
offer the opponent is ready to make, which results from Condition 3.7:
x ≤ 1− β(1− wl)− (1− β)wO = x′l (3.9)
It follows from Conditions 3.8 and 3.9 that there is a screening equilibrium for xl > x
′
l in
which the opponent makes a screening offer x = wl that is accepted by the weak unbiased
type and rejected by the strong biased type, and there is a pooling equilibrium for xl ≤ x′l in
which the offer x = max{xl, wl} is accepted by both types of agent.
Let λ˜l define the maximum λ for which a pooling equilibrium exists. Then λ˜l is determined
by:
x
′
l ≥ xl
⇔ 1− β(1− wl)− (1− β)wO ≥ 1 + wh − 1
λ
⇔ λ ≤ 1
(1− wl)β + (1− β)wO + wh = λ˜l (3.10)
For λ > λ˜l a screening equilibrium results.
Corollary 5 When bargaining is open-door and reputation is sufficiently important to biased
agents, so that λ ≤ min{λ˜l, λ˜h}, the opponent makes a pooling offer x = wh if wP = wh and
x = max{wl, xl} if wP = wl and democracy always accepts this offer in equilibrium. When
λ > λ˜h and wP = wh, the opponent makes a screening offer x = max{wl, xh} that is rejected
with probability 1− β, by the strong unbiased type. When λ > λ˜l and wP = wl, the opponent
makes a screening offer x = wl that is rejected with probability 1 − β, by the strong biased
type.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below show the equilibrium offer in the two cases wP = wh and
wP = wl. We can see that as long as reelection concerns are sufficiently important (λ ≤
min{λ˜l, λ˜h}), the opponent makes a pooling offer that is peacefully accepted.
In the following, I will analyze whether democratic transparency, that is, revealing the
democratic public’s type to the opponent in international bargaining leads to disadvantageous
bargaining outcomes for democracies. To do so, I compare the equilibrium offer that the
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opponent makes in the Democracy/Autocracy case with that in the Autocracy/Autocracy
case. We know from Section 3.2 that in the Autocracy/Autocracy case, the opponent makes
a pooling offer wh if the probability that the autocrat is a weak type is sufficiently low, β ≤ β˜
and a screening offer wl if β˜ < β.
9
It follows that a democracy is comparably worse off in terms of the bargaining share when
β ≤ β˜ and wP = wl because x∗ < wh, see Figure 3.3 below. When wP = wh and the agent
cares sufficiently about reelection, so that λ ≤ λ˜h the outcome is the same for both regime
types, a pooling offer wh, see Figure 3.2 below.
When β > β˜, the opponent makes a screening offer wl in the Autocracy/Autocracy case.
In that case, the share that the opponent offers to a democracy is at least as high as what he
would offer an autocracy. When wP = wh and the agent cares sufficiently about reelection,
so that λ ≤ λ˜h the equilibrium offer is strictly higher wh > wl in the Democracy/Autocracy
case, see Figure 3.2. When wP = wl and λ ≤ λ˜l, the equilibrium offer is higher than in the
Autocracy/Autocracy case if x∗ = xl > wl, otherwise it is the same.
9This is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Overall, the probability of war is smaller in the Democracy/Autocracy as long as demo-
cratic agents care sufficiently about reelection. Even though, democracies make screening
offers as frequently as autocracies so that the probability of war is the same as in the Autoc-
racy/Autocracy case whenever it is democracy’s turn to make an offer, when it is democracy’s
turn to respond, the opponent’s (pooling) offer is accepted, so that the probability of war is
zero in this case.
Democracy/Democracy
When the opponent is a democracy, there is the opposing state’s principal and agent to take
into account. Let OA denote the agent from the opposing state and OP its principal, with
wOP ∈ {wl, wh} and wOA ∈ {wl, wh} their respective outside options.
Democratic peace results if both states make pooling offers. First, I look at the case when
the home state principal’s outside option is wP = wh. The opposing principal’s incentive
condition for a pooling offer x = wh coincides with Condition 3.3. It follows that for λ ≤ λ˜h,
OP prefers a pooling offer xh which is the minimum offer that a weak home agent is ready
to accept and determined by Condition 3.4.
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When wOP = wh, then a pooling offer is always optimal independent of λ because if
a pooling offer is optimal for the strong type, it is also optimal for the weak type. When
wOP = wl and wOA = wh, the opposing state’s agent OA might have an incentive to make a
screening offer. He is ready to make the pooling offer if
λ(1−wh)+(1−λ)Pr(u | x = 1−xp) ≥ λ(β(1−xh)+(1−β)wOA)+(1−λ)Pr(u | x 6= 1−xp)
Let λ˜Oh denote the maximum λ at which OA is ready to make the pooling offer. For Pr(u |
x = 1− xp) = 1 and Pr(u | x 6= 1− xp) = 0, λ˜Oh is determined by
λ ≤ 1
β(1− xh) + (1− β)wOA + wh
= λ˜Oh (3.11)
When the home state principal’s outside option is wP = wl, the opposing principal’s incentive
condition for a pooling offer x ≥ wl coincides with Condition 3.7. It follows that for λ ≤ λ˜l,
OP prefers the pooling offer xl which is the minimum offer that is acceptable to both types
of the home agent and determined by Condition 3.8. Again, when wOP = wh, a pooling offer
is always optimal independent of λ. When wOP = wl and wOA = wh, OA might have an
incentive to make a screening offer. He is ready to make the pooling offer if
λ(1−x) + (1−λ)Pr(u | x = 1−xp) ≥ λ(β(1−wl) + (1−β)wOA) + (1−λ)Pr(u | x 6= 1−xp)
Let λ˜Ol denote the maximum λ at which OA is ready to make the pooling offer. For Pr(u |
x = 1− xp) = 1 and Pr(u | x 6= 1− xp) = 0, λ˜Ol is determined by
λ ≤ 1
β(1− wl) + (1− β)wOA + xl
= λ˜Ol (3.12)
Corollary 6 When reputation is sufficiently important to democratic agents, pooling offers
are made and accepted both ways, which constitutes the democratic peace.
47
3.5.2 Closed-door bargaining
When bargaining takes place behind closed doors, there is informational asymmetry. The
principal cannot observe who makes the offer, what the offer looks like and which offer has
been rejected by whom.
Under closed-door bargaining, the agent’s payoff can change because Pr(u | war) is no
longer certain. When an offer is accepted, the principal can still infer who made the offer
and whether the agent acted in a biased manner.10 However, when it comes to the rejection
of an offer and war occurs, the principal can no longer identify the reason, because war can
result either if the agent rejects an offer or if the agent’s offer is rejected.
Democracy/Autocracy
Under closed-door bargaining, the principal cannot distinguish between responder and pro-
poser which means that there are no longer two subgames that can be analyzed independently.
The principal’s optimal offer to the opponent depends on the principal’s type and the prob-
ability that the opposing autocrat is weak, as explained in Section 3.2:
(a) α ≤ α′ , both types prefer a pooling offer.
(b) α
′
< α ≤ α′′ , the weak type prefers a pooling and the strong type a screening offer.
(c) α
′′
< α, both types prefer a screening offer.
When wP = wh, the agent acts according to the principal’s preferences if he rejects x < wh
and, in Cases (b) and (c), makes a screening offer. It follows that in Cases (b) and (c)
Pr(u | war) = 1, independent of the opponent’s offer because acting biased either means
accepting an offer x < wh or making a pooling offer to the opponent, both actions which do
not lead to war. For Pr(u | war) = 1 (and Pr(u | x < wh) = 0) the weak type’s incentive
constraint is the same as under open-door bargaining and equilibrium is determined as stated
in Corollary 5.
In Case (a), it is optimal for both types to make a pooling offer to the opponent. In this case,
10In case of agreement, the principal’s share is 1−whO when the agent made a pooling offer, 1−wlO
when the agent made a screening offer, and wl ≤ x ≤ wh < 1−wlO when the opponent made a pooling
offer.
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Pr(u | war) is an off-equilibrium belief if the opponent’s best response is also a pooling offer.
Otherwise, when the opponent makes a screening offer, Pr(u | war) = 0 which is the same as
under open-door bargaining so that the results are the same. Only when the off-equilibrium
belief Pr(u | war) > 0, the weak type’s incentive constraint, Condition 3.4 changes:
xh,c =
1− λ
λ
Pr(u | war) + wl (3.13)
where xh,c < xh for Pr(u | war) < 1. In terms of λ, a screening equilibrium results if:
xh,c ≥ x′h
⇔ 1− λ
λ
Pr(u | war) + wl ≥ 1− wO − 1− wO − wh
β
so that the critical λ from which screening is optimal is determined by
λ ≤ βPr(u | war)
(Pr(u | war)− wl)β − (1− β)(1− wO) + wh = λ˜h,c (3.14)
Since λ˜h,c < λ˜h for Pr(u | war) < 1, the critical threshold for a screening equilibrium is lower
compared to open-door bargaining for Pr(u | war) < 1.
However, Pr(u | war) < 1 is not a plausible off-equilibrium belief because it would mean
that the principal believes that the agent did not act in his interest in case of war but
somehow acted more aggressive. This is not possible since the principal is a strong type and
the agent can either be equally strong or weaker. The only plausible off-equilibrium belief
is Pr(u | war) = 1 for which the results do not differ from the results under open-door
bargaining.
Corollary 7 When wP = wh, the results are the same as under open-door bargaining in
Cases (b) and (c). In Case (a), the threshold for a pooling equilibrium may be below the
threshold under open-door bargaining, however only for implausible off-equilibrium beliefs. For
the only plausible off-equilibrium belief the results are the same as under open-door bargaining.
When wP = wl and Case (c), Pr(u | war) = 1 if the opponent makes a pooling offer x ≤ wh
and the strong agent’s incentive constraint holds. But when Pr(u | war) = Pr(u | x ≥ wl) =
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1, the strong agent’s incentive constraint, Condition 3.2, only holds if x = wh, otherwise, for
x < wh, it fails:
λx+ (1− λ)Pr(u | x) < λwh + (1− λ)Pr(u | war)
It follows that x = wh is the only candidate for a pooling equilibrium.
The opponent is ready to offer x = wh as long as
β(1− wl) + (1− β)wO ≤ 1− wh
⇔ β ≤ 1− wO − wh
1− wO − wl = β˜ (3.15)
For β > β˜ a pooling equilibrium does not exist.
There is a screening equilibrium, in which the opponent offers x = wl and the offer is accepted
by the weak and rejected by the strong type. Since in Case (c) it is optimal to make a screening
offer to the opponent, Pr(u | war) = αβ1−β+α in the screening equilibrium. The opponent has
no incentive to deviate to a pooling offer wl < x ≤ wh acceptable to both types if such
pooling offer generates less payoff than the screening offer x = wl. The critical offer x
′
l,c for
which the opponent still prefers pooling is determined by Condition 3.9, so that:
x
′
l,c = x
′
l = 1− β(1− wl)− (1− β)wO
As long as this offer is smaller than the minimum offer the strong agent is ready to accept,
a screening equilibrium results. The strong agent’s minimum acceptable offer is determined
by Condition 3.2. and given by
xl,c = wh − 1− λ
λ
(1− Pr(u | war))
It follows that a screening equilibrium results if,
xl,c > x
′
l,c
⇔ wh − 1− λ
λ
(1− Pr(u | war)) > 1− β(1− wl)− (1− β)wO
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Rearranging this condition gives the critical λ from which a screening equilibrium results
λ >
1− Pr(u | war)
(1− wl)β + (1− β)wO + wh − Pr(u | war) = λ˜l,c
It is easy to check that λ˜l > λ˜l,c for Pr(u | war) > 0. Since Pr(u | war) = αβ1−β+α > 0
under closed-door bargaining, the threshold for a screening equilibrium is lower than under
open-door bargaining.
When λ ≤ λ˜l,c, there are partial pooling equilibria in which the opponent offers wl < x < wh
which the weak type always accepts and the strong type accepts with probability θ and rejects
with probability 1− θ. In these equilibria, the opponent chooses x so that the strong type is
indifferent between accepting x and rejecting it:
λx+ (1− λ)Pr(u | x) = λwh + (1− λ)Pr(u | war)
⇔ x = wh − 1− λ
λ
(Pr(u | x)− Pr(u | war))
For Pr(u | x ≥ wl) = 1 and Pr(u | war) =
1
2
αβ
1
2
αβ+( 12 (1−θ)+ 12α)(1−β)
= αβ(1−θ)(1−β+α)+θα we get
x = wh − 1− λ
λ
(1− θ)(1− β)(1 + α)
(1− θ)(1− β + α) + θα = xl,c (3.16)
which defines the equilibrium offer.
In a partial pooling equilibrium, θ must be such that the opponent prefers making the
pooling offer over making the screening offer x = wl acceptable only to the weak type:
β(1− wl) + (1− β)wO ≤ (β + (1− β)θ)(1− x) + (1− β)(1− θ)wO
Rearranging the condition above gives the maximum offer the opponent is ready to make in
a partial pooling equilibrium:
x ≤ 1− β(1− wl) + (1− β)θwO
β + (1− β)θ = x
′
l,c (3.17)
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In a partial pooling equilibrium, the opponent chooses x = max{wl, xl,c}. Since xl < xl,c,
the offer in the partial pooling equilibria is strictly higher than in the pooling equilibrium
under open-door bargaining as long as xl,c > wl. Also, xl,c increases in θ. The more often
the strong type accepts the pooling offer, the higher the belief that war has been started
in the principal’s interest, and the higher the strong type’s incentive to exploit this belief
which induces the opponent to increase his offer. Since x
′
l > x
′
l,c for all θ < 1 and xl < xl,c,
the threshold for (partial) pooling is lower than the threshold for pooling under open-door
bargaining.
In Cases (a) and (b), the agent acts in the principal’s interest when he makes a pooling
offer. Then Pr(u | war) is an off-equilibrium belief if the opponent’s best response is also a
pooling offer, and the strong agent is ready to accept and make a pooling offer. Otherwise,
when either the opponent makes a screening offer or the strong agent makes a screening offer
to the opponent, Pr(u | war) = 0 which is the same as under open-door bargaining so that
the results are the same. Only when the off-equilibrium belief Pr(u | war) > 0, the strong
agent’s incentive constraint differs from that under open-door bargaining and the minimum
offer acceptable to both types changes:
xl,c = wh − 1− λ
λ
(1− Pr(u | war)) (3.18)
where xl,c > xl for Pr(u | war) > 0. Since xl,c > xl for Pr(u | war) > 0, a pooling equilibrium
results for a lower range of λ. We can see this by comparing the minimum acceptable offer
to both types xl,c with the maximum pooling offer the opponent is ready to make x
′
l which
is defined by (3.9). A pooling equilibrium results if
xl,c ≤ x′l
⇔ wh − 1− λ
λ
(1− Pr(u | war)) ≤ 1− wO − 1− wO − wh
β
⇔ λ ≤ 1− Pr(u | war)
wh − Pr(u | war) + wO − 1−wO−whβ
= λ˜l,c (3.19)
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which defines the critical λ for which a pooling equilibrium results. Since λ˜l,c < λ˜l for
Pr(u | war) > 0, the critical threshold for a pooling equilibrium is lower compared to open-
door bargaining for Pr(u | war) > 0.
However, Pr(u | war) > 0 is not a plausible off-equilibrium belief because it would imply
that going to war was in the principal’s best interest when we know that the principal is
weak and a weak type would always prefer to stick to his equilibrium action instead of going
to war. The only plausible off-equilibrium belief is Pr(u | war) = 0 for which the results are
the same as under open-door bargaining.
Corollary 8 When wP = wl, and it is optimal for both types to make a screening offer to
the opponent (Case (c)), there is a pooling equilibrium for β ≤ β˜ in which the opponent
offers x = wh. In addition, there are partial pooling equilibria for λ ≤ λ˜l,c < λ˜l, with a
positive probability of war but potentially higher offers compared to open-door bargaining,
since xl,c > xl, and a screening equilibrium for λ > λ˜l,c with the same offer as under open-
door bargaining. In Cases (b) and (c), the results are the same as under open-door bargaining
for the only plausible off-equilibrium belief.
When wP = wl, and it is optimal from the principal’s point of view to make a screening
offer to the opponent, closed-door bargaining can generate a higher pooling offer from the
opponent compared to open-door bargaining. The offer in the screening equilibrium is the
same under open- and closed-door bargaining. However, the threshold λ for which a screening
equilibrium results is lower than under open-door bargaining. When λ is below this threshold,
λ ≤ λ˜l,c, partial pooling equilibria can be supported in which the offer may be higher than
under open-door bargaining. The reason for this is that under open-door bargaining the
principal can immediately observe whether an agent acts in the principal’s interest. More
specifically, when the agent rejects an offer, the principal knows that the agent is biased.
Here, observing war, does not necessarily mean that the agent acted biased because war can
also occur when the agent acted in the principal’s interest by making a screening offer to the
opponent. That is why, the posterior belief that the agent acted in the principal’s interest
given that war can be observed has to be positive, Pr(u | war) > 0. This higher Pr(u | war)
increases the strong agent’s incentive to reject the opponent’s offer so that the opponent
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needs to make a higher offer in order to keep the strong agent satisfied under closed-door
bargaining.
Besides these two equilibria types, there is a pooling equilibrium for β ≤ β˜ that only
exists under closed-door bargaining in which the opponent offers x = wh even though the
public signal is low. This equilibrium coincides with the pooling equilibrium in the Autoc-
racy/Autocracy case.
The results from Corollary 7 and 8 suggest that a democracy bargaining with an autocracy
prefers closed-door bargaining whenever the democratic public has a weak resolve for war and
is indifferent between open- and closed door bargaining when the democratic public is highly
resolved.
Democracy/Democracy
Section 3.5.1 shows that when reelection is sufficiently important to democratic agents, pool-
ing offers are made and accepted in equilibrium when the bargaining process is public. Under
closed-door bargaining, this equilibrium also exists with Pr(u | war) as an off-equilibrium
belief.
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3.6 Conclusion
The paper develops a simple game-theoretic model based on the bargaining approach to
war. The analysis shows that general transparency within democracies and accountability
of democratic leaders enables democracies to signal their resolve for war successfully, so
that war can be avoided when two democracies interact, constituting the phenomenon of
democratic peace. Further, I show that this revealing of preferences need not necessarily
be to the democracy’s disadvantage, but that under some circumstances, democracies can
capture higher shares in the bargaining game than an autocrat would in the same position.
Another contribution of the paper is to analyze how the level of agency transparency
affects the outcome of crisis bargaining. In this regard, I analyze under which circumstances
democracies prefer open- or closed-door bargaining.
55
Chapter 4
Dynamic Pricing in Lemons
Markets
Abstract
In this paper, I study markets with two-sided asymmetric information: quality uncertainty
on part of some buyers and uncertainty about the buyer’s knowledge of quality on part of
the sellers. It will be shown that resolving one source of uncertainty, by giving sellers the
opportunity to learn the buyer’s type and price discriminate, can lead to increased adverse
selection and a decrease in overall welfare. The reason for this is that informed buyers can
act as a deterrent for low quality sellers to mimic good quality when sellers can only quote
one price to all buyers.
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4.1 Introduction
Ever since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper, adverse selection has been widely investigated
in different market models and under different assumptions. One assumption, that is sur-
prisingly robust in the literature, is the idea that all buyers are equally uninformed about
quality.
The present paper seeks to relax this assumption. Its starting point is motivated by
previous research on customer-specific price discrimination which supports the idea that
buyers are not homogenous in their knowledge of quality and that sellers use certain cues to
identify informed buyers. There is evidence to this effect from traditional on-site transactions,
and even more so from online transactions.
For example, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) study race and gender discrimination in on-site
bargaining for a new car and find that black and female test buyers are quoted significantly
higher prices than their male counterparts using identical, scripted bargaining strategies. As
a possible explanation for this result, Ayres and Siegelman suggest that car dealers believe
white males to be more knowledgeable of quality. They observe that “dealers were somewhat
more likely to volunteer information about the cost of the car to white males than to the
other testers, possibly because they believed that white males already had such information.”
(Ayres and Siegelman 1995) The study suggests that there are important cues that salespeo-
ple can use in on-site transactions to gauge a customer’s information status and infer his
willingness to pay.
Even though transactions over the internet obfuscate some of these consumer characteris-
tics, the increasing development of information technologies and web-browser cookies allows
firms to collect, keep, and process even more and possibly more precise information about
consumers. Information about consumers’ previous buying or search behavior may be used to
charge customer-specific prices, a pricing practice known in the literature as behavior-based
price discrimination.1
It is only a small step from there to conjecture that firms can use a consumer’s browser
history to infer the consumer’s knowledge of quality and identify him as an informed or
1See for example Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) for a survey on behavior-based price discrimi-
nation.
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uninformed buyer.
In this paper, I am interested in the question, if sellers can obtain information about
the buyer’s knowledge of the product’s quality, how does that affect adverse selection, and
efficiency in lemons markets in general. The purpose of the paper is twofold: First, it is to
establish equilibria in markets susceptible to the lemons problem, in which some buyers also
have knowledge of quality. Second, it is to clear what welfare effects customer-specific price
discrimination has in such markets.
To that end, two settings are investigated, a uniform pricing regime in which sellers do
not price discriminate and a dynamic pricing regime in which sellers can acquire consumer
data, identify the buyer’s type and price discriminate on an individual level based on the
buyer’s knowledge of quality.
In order to account for differences in buyer information, I employ a lemons market model
in which sellers set individual prices and are matched randomly with buyers, a market model
that has first been analyzed in Wilson (1980). In contrast to the centralized market approach
in Akerlof (1970), buyers and sellers can be modeled heterogenously and there may be different
prices in the market instead of only one price.
I find that, under uniform pricing, the existence of informed buyers can reduce adverse
selection. Since informed buyers do not buy low quality at a high price, the low quality
seller’s incentive to offer at a high price is diminished because he can only quote one price to
all consumers and needs to take into account the informed buyers resistance to buy overpriced
low quality goods. Anticipating the low quality seller’s reduced incentive to cheat, uninformed
buyers are ready to buy at a high price more frequently which reduces adverse selection.
When dynamic pricing becomes possible (through browser histories or other methods),
the market gets segmented based on consumer types. First, there is an informed buyers
market in which trade can always be concluded. Second, there is an uninformed buyers
market in which adverse selection may be more severe than under uniform pricing due to
the absence of informed buyers. Only if average quality is sufficiently high and there is a
pooling equilibrium in the uninformed buyer’s market, dynamic pricing leads to a welfare
improvement. Whenever the sellers separate in their prices and quote different prices to
uninformed buyers, adverse selection is more severe than in the unsegmented market because
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low quality sellers no longer need to factor in informed buyers’ resistance to buy at a high
price. In these cases, dynamic pricing leads to a welfare loss.
Releated Literature
There is extensive literature on markets with quality uncertainty, which, following Akerlof
(1970), are termed lemons markets. Only few papers have so far considered lemons mar-
kets with a partially informed buyer side. Bester and Ritzberger (2001) give consumers the
possibility to buy a perfect quality signal and investigate how this affects equilibrium with
a monopolistic seller. In Voorneveld and Weibull (2011) all buyers receive a costless but
noisy private signal about quality in a competitive market with quality uncertainty. In both
models, buyers are homogenous in the beginning because they face the same cost of acquiring
information about quality.
In the present paper, buyers are heterogenous in their quality information from the be-
ginning. Some buyers are informed about quality and some are not. With this respect, the
paper is related to a range of signaling models showing that monopolistic sellers can signal
high quality by charging high prices, in particular so when some informed consumers are
present. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) predict upward price
distortion for signaling purposes. Most recently, Mahenc (2004) develops a signaling model,
in which informed buyers are necessary for a monopolist to use prices as signals of product
quality.
In contrast to this literature, the pricing side of the present model is not a monopoly
but competitive. Most pertinent in this regard is Kessler (2001) who, like the present paper,
stays within a competitive framework. Kessler (2001) can be considered as the theoretic
counterpart to the present paper as she also extends Akerlof’s model by relaxing the strict
assumptions to the information status of the players and compares market performance under
two different informational structures. The crucial difference is that where I assume some
buyers to be equally informed as the sellers, Kessler looks at the case in which some sellers
are equally uninformed as the buyers.
The paper is also related to the literature on dynamic pricing, focussing mostly on its
effect on profit and consumer surplus in different market structures. The diversity of topics
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that is investigated in this context, includes: dynamic pricing in dynamic settings (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 2000), the impact of dynamic pricing on consumer perceptions of price fairness
(Haws and Bearden, 2006), the effect of dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic and
avail themselves for the low price (Chen and Zhang, 2009) or avoid revealing information
that will hurt them (Taylor, 2004).
There is no literature investigating the effect of price discrimination on adverse selection
in markets with two-sided asymmetric information. In such markets, buyers have different
knowledge of quality and sellers can learn the buyer’s type and tailor special prices on an
individual level. The present article closes this gap, as it particularly addresses the impact
of dynamic pricing on adverse selection.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 lays down the market model with informed
buyers, section 3 defines equilibria in this market with uniform prices based on the share of
informed buyers. Section 4 defines equilibria with information acquisition and price discrim-
ination. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
Consider the following market: There are potential sellers of an indivisible object and poten-
tial buyers. Each seller owns and each buyer wishes to purchase only one unit of the object.
The market operates for only one period. All agents enter the market at the beginning of
this period and each seller posts a fixed price. Agents are matched randomly. Sellers differ in
the quality of the object they want to sell. A seller owns good quality qh with probability λ
and bad quality ql with probability 1− λ. Buyers can also be sorted into different, privately
known types because their information on quality varies. A buyer is either perfectly informed
about quality with probability θ or completely uninformed with probability 1− θ. I consider
the most simple model in which types are all binary. The seller’s and buyer’s expected payoffs
vs and vb are given by
vs = σp+ (1− σ)qi (4.1)
and
vb = σ(qi − p) (4.2)
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where  ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed valuation parameter, p is the price for quality q and σ is a binary
variable with σ = 1 if the object is sold and σ = 0 otherwise.
If quality were publicly observable to all buyers, all objects would be sold at pi = qi
∀i ∈ {l, h}, that is the buyer’s reservation value. The seller can capture the entire surplus
from trade because he can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (post a price) and the buyer’s outside
option is zero.2 Throughout the paper, it will be assumed that qh > ql, so that  >
ql
qh
which
implies that a high quality seller will not sell at a low price because his reservation price qh
exceeds the maximum price that buyers are willing to pay for low quality ql.
When quality is observable only to informed buyers, buyers differ in the maximum amount
they are willing to pay. Informed buyers are ready to buy as long as p ≤ q and uninformed
buyers form expectations about quality and upon these expectations they decide to buy
or not. In the presence of informed buyers, the outcome depends on the seller’s ability to
differentiate between the two buyer types. In the following, I will analyze the welfare effects
of the two respective market environments of uniform pricing in which sellers are unaware of
the buyers’ types and of dynamic pricing in which sellers learn the buyers’ types.
Independent of the market environment, in equilibrium, the price of a low quality object
cannot be below the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay for low quality because a low quality
seller offering for less than ql could always increase his price to ql and still sell for sure. It
follows that, in equilibria with different prices, the price for low quality will be equal to the
buyer’s maximum willingness to pay for low quality: p∗l = ql. On the other hand, a buyer
will not buy if the seller asks a price above the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay for high
quality. Since a seller of high quality only sells above qh, in equilibrium it must be that
p∗h ∈ [qh, qh].
2Here, the buyer’s outside option is zero because the market only operates for one period which
leaves him without an opportunity to find an alternative seller. The fact that the seller captures the
entire surplus from trade does not change even if we assume that the market operates for more than
one period and the buyer can search for another seller. Following Diamond (1971), each seller can
charge the monopoly price in this setting as long as search costs are posititve.
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4.3 Uniform Pricing
Under uniform pricing, each seller quotes one price to the buyer that he is matched with,
independent of the buyer’s type. Quite generally, when quality is private information, low
quality sellers have two options. They can either imitate high quality sellers and hope to be
mistaken for high quality or they post a low price and make a sale for sure.
Due to the presence of informed buyers, low quality sellers face an additional restraint
from offering at a high price because informed buyers do not buy low quality at a high price.3
When there are sufficiently many informed buyers, low quality sellers can even be deterred
completely from mimicking high quality because the sale probability at the high price is too
low for the low quality sellers who therefore prefer posting a low price which definitely results
in trade. In this case, efficient fully separating equilibria can be obtained.
Otherwise, there are 3 different possible but inefficient types of equilibria: fully separating
equilibria, semi-separating equilibria and, under some conditions, also a pooling equilibrium.
For a start, I investigate the existence of efficient fully separating equilibria. Such equi-
libria exist if all goods are traded, all high quality sellers post a high price ph and all low
quality sellers post a low price pl.
Efficient-Fully Separating Equilibria
When the share of informed buyers θ is sufficiently high, then low quality sellers prefer posting
a low price which definitely results in sale (left hand side of the condition below) over posting
a high price which deters informed buyers (right hand side of the condition below):
ql − ql ≥ (1− θ)(ph − ql)
⇔ θ ≥ ph − ql
ph − ql (4.3)
Proposition 2 There is an efficient separating equilibrium for θ ≥ θ˜ = qh−qlqh−ql . Low quality
sellers post a low price p∗l = ql and high quality sellers post a high price p
∗
h = qh. All buyers
buy at the posted price so that all goods are traded and the market is efficient.
3Since qh > ql, the minimum price acceptable to high quality sellers is higher than the buyer’s
maximum willingness to pay for low quality.
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Proof. It is obvious that the high quality seller has no incentive to deviate from the
proposed strategy because he captures the entire surplus from trade and trades for sure. Given
Condition 4.3, low quality sellers have no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy.
The buyers have no incentive to deviate because they are indifferent between buying and not.
The following results apply to situations in which θ < θ˜ and the share of informed buyers
is below the critical threshold that guarantees the efficient separating equilibrium as stated
in Proposition 3.
First of all, it is important to note that there are efficient separating equilibria even for
θ < θ˜. Since a lower share θ < θ˜ can be substituted to some extent with a lower price, the
high price needs to be smaller than in the efficient equilibrium shown above, ph < qh, in
order to reduce the low quality seller’s incentive to mimic high quality in these equilibria.
Rearranging Condition 4.3 gives an upper constraint on ph that guarantees that low quality
sellers have no incentive to deviate to the high price:
ph ≤ ql − θql
1− θ < qh (4.4)
We also need to make sure that the high price is not too small in order to prevent high
quality sellers from posting the maximum high price qh and selling only to informed buyers.
The following condition guarantees that:
ph − qh ≥ θ(qh − qh)
⇔ ph ≥ θqh + (1− θ)qh (4.5)
Proposition 3 For θ˜ > θ ≥ θ∗, there are efficient fully-separating equilibria in which the
low quality seller posts p∗l = ql and the high quality seller posts p
∗
h =
ql−θql
1−θ < qh. All buyers
buy at the posted price so that all goods are traded and the outcome is efficient.
Proof. Buyers have no incentive to deviate because they are indifferent between buying
and not buying when matched with low quality sellers and get positive utility when matched
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with high quality sellers since p∗h < qh. In equilibrium, Condition 4.4, the low quality seller’s
incentive constraint is binding because at any price p ∈
[
θqh+(1−θ)qh, ql−θql1−θ
)
, high quality
sellers have an incentive to deviate to p∗h =
ql−θql
1−θ in order to get a higher profit.
In equilibrium, the high quality seller’s incentive constraint (Condition 4.5) must hold at p∗h:
ql − θql
1− θ ≥ θqh + (1− θ)qh
which gives the minimum θ for which these equilibria exist:
θ =
(
qh(1− 2)− ql
)
+
√(
qh(1− 2)− ql
)2 − 4(qh(1− ))(ql − qh)
2(qh − qh) = θ
∗
Inefficient Fully-Separating Equilibria
For θ < θ˜ there are also inefficient fully-separating equilibria with prices p∗h = qh and p
∗
l = ql.
Given these prices, uninformed buyers are indifferent between buying and not buying (in both
cases the expected payoff is zero). They can therefore also use any mixed strategy. With
this in mind, equilibria can be constructed in which uninformed buyers put sufficient weight
on not buying at a high price, so that the low quality seller is deterred from posting a high
price. The low quality seller is deterred as long as his expected profit selling at a low price to
all buyers weakly exceeds his expected profit selling at a high price only to those uninformed
buyers who are ready to buy at a high price. Let β be the probability with which uninformed
buyers buy at a high price. The following must hold:
ql − ql ≥ (1− θ)β(qh − ql)
⇔ β ≤ ql − ql
(qh − ql)(1− θ) = β˜ (4.6)
Proposition 4 For θ˜ > θ ≥ 0, there is a range of inefficient fully-separating equilibria in
which the high quality seller posts p∗h = qh and the low quality seller posts p
∗
l = ql. Uninformed
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buyers mix between “accept p∗l and p
∗
h” and “accept only p
∗
l ”, choosing “accept p
∗
l and p
∗
h”
with probability 0 ≤ β ≤ β˜.
Proof. Condition 4.6 together with the assumption that the uninformed buyer’s off-equilibrium
belief that quality is low equals 1, assures that neither seller type has an incentive to post
any other price. Buyers have no incentive to deviate because they are indifferent between
buying at p∗l or p
∗
h and not buying.
It is easy to see that there are no other inefficient fully-separating equilibria because at
any other high price ph < p
∗
h (at ph > p
∗
h no one will buy), uninformed buyers would strictly
prefer to buy at ph and no longer be indifferent between buying and not buying. But if
uninformed buyers always buy at ph, then low quality sellers have an incentive to post ph
instead of p∗l which would prevent full separation.
In the worst of these equilibria, β = 0 and uninformed buyers do not buy at a high price
at all. Still, high quality goods are sold with probability θ to informed buyers. In the best
of these equilibria, uninformed buyers buy at a high price with probability β˜ so that the sale
probability of high quality goods equals θ + β˜(1− θ).
Infficient Semi-Separating Equilibria
In addition to the efficient and inefficient fully-separating equilibria, there is also a range of
semi-separating equilibria for θ < θ˜ in which low quality sellers mix between posting a high
and a low price and uninformed buyers mix between buying at both prices and buying only
at the low price.
For a mixed equilibrium to exist, players need to be indifferent between the pure strategies
that are used in the mix. Suppose the low quality seller, that occurs with probability 1 −
λ, chooses ph with probability α and pl with probability 1 − α. The uninformed buyer
chooses “accept pl and ph” with probability β and “accept only pl” with probability 1 − β.
Consequently, the low quality seller is indifferent between ph and pl if:
(ph − ql)(1− θ)β = pl − ql
65
⇔ β = pl − ql
(1− θ)(ph − ql) (4.7)
The uninformed buyer is indifferent between “accept pl and ph” and “accept only pl” if
E(q | ph)− ph = 0, that is:
(1− λ)αql + λqh
(1− λ)α+ λ − ph = 0
⇔ α = λ(qh − ph)
(1− λ)(ph − ql)
ph < qh constitutes a lower bound on β: β > β(qh) = β˜.
We also need to keep in mind that high quality sellers must be ready to offer their good,
that is, their expected profit from offering their car at a price ph must be at least θ(qh− qh),
which is what high quality sellers can always get by selling at the maximum price only to
informed buyers:
(β(1− θ) + θ)(ph − qh) ≥ θ(qh − qh)
⇔ ph ≥ θqh + β(1− θ)qh
β(1− θ) + θ (4.8)
Proposition 5 For θ˜ > θ ≥ 0, there are semi-separating equilibria with prices p∗h and p∗l ,
where p∗l = ql and pˆh ≤ p∗h < qh. The high quality seller always posts p∗h, while the low quality
seller posts p∗h only with probability α
∗ = qh−p
∗
h
p∗h−ql
λ
1−λ . The informed buyer buys at p
∗
h if the
quality is high and the uninformed buyer buys at p∗h with probability β
∗ = ql−ql(p∗h−ql)(1−θ) .
Proof. By construction, the low quality seller and uninformed buyer are indifferent
between their pure strategies in the support of their mixed strategies. Given that the unin-
formed buyer’s off-equilibrium belief that quality is low is 1, Condition 4.8 prevents the high
quality seller from deviating to selling only to informed buyers.
Inefficient Pooling Equilibrium
Finally, there is an additional pooling equilibrium in which both types of sellers post the
same price equal to expected quality, p = λqh+(1−λ)ql. Since ql < λqh+(1−λ)ql, informed
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buyers do not buy from low quality sellers at p. Therefore, we need to make sure that low
quality sellers are ready to post p instead of posting ql and selling also to informed buyers.
The following condition guarantees that the low quality seller’s expected profit from selling
at p only to uninformed buyers weakly exceeds the profit from selling at ql to all buyers:
(p− ql)(1− θ) ≥ ql − ql
⇔ (λqh + (1− λ)ql − ql)(1− θ) ≥ ql − ql
⇔ θ ≤ λ(qh − ql)
λ(qh − ql) + ql − ql (4.9)
But also high quality sellers must be ready to offer their good at p. Since high quality sellers
always have the option to sell at the maximum price only to informed buyers, we need to
make sure that their expected profit from offering at p must be at least θ(qh − qh), their
profit from selling only to informed buyers:
p− qh ≥ θ(qh − qh)
⇔ λqh + (1− λ)ql − qh ≥ θ(qh − qh)
⇔ θ ≤ λ(qh − ql) + ql − qh
qh − qh (4.10)
Both high and low quality sellers only sell their good if the pooling price p is sufficiently
high. p increases in the share of high quality goods λ. The higher the share of informed buyers
θ, the higher must be λ for the sellers’ incentive constraints to still be fulfilled. Rearranging
conditions 4.8 and 4.9, we get the following constraints on λ:
λ ≥ θ(ql − ql)
(1− θ)(qh − ql) (4.11)
for the low quality seller and
λ ≥ θ(qh − qh) + qh − ql
qh − ql (4.12)
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for the high quality seller.
Proposition 6 If θ ≤ min
{
λ(qh−ql)+ql−qh
qh−qh ,
λ(qh−ql)
λ(qh−ql)+ql−ql
}
, there is pooling equilibrium in
which p∗ = λqh + (1 − λ)ql. Sellers unanimously post p∗ and uninformed buyers always buy
at that price, whereas informed buyers only buy when matched with a high quality seller.
Therefore, the market is inefficient.
Note that for λ = 1 Condition 4.9, approaches θ˜ = qh−qlqh−ql which implies that there is a unique
efficient fully-separating equilibrium when the share of good quality approaches one. Also,
for λ = 0 there is a unique efficient equilibrium with p = ql.
When 0 < λ < 1, the presence of informed buyers makes a pooling equilibrium less likely
because an increasing share of informed buyers reduces the sale probability at p∗ for low
quality sellers and increases the incentive for high quality sellers to post qh instead of p
∗ and
sell only to informed buyers. In the pooling equilibrium, all high quality goods are traded,
which means that there is no adverse selection. However, the situation is not efficient since
informed buyers do buy low quality with probability θ. This inefficiency increases in the
share of informed buyers θ.
Figure 4.1 below illustrates all equilibria of the model with informed buyers. With regard
to efficiency, there is a unique efficient equilibrium when the share of informed buyers is above
some critical threshold, θ ≥ θ˜. When the share of informed buyers is below that threshold,
multiple equilibria may exist simultaneously. Efficient fully-separating equilibria only exist
for θ˜ > θ ≥ θ∗.
Inefficient separating equilibria exist in the range θ˜ > θ ≥ 0. In the fully-separating
equilibria, there is adverse selection since all low quality goods are traded but not all high
quality goods. In the semi-separating equilibria, there are two sources of inefficiency: First,
not all high quality goods are traded which constitutes some degree of adverse selection.
Second, not all low quality goods are traded because informed buyers do not buy low quality
selling at a high price.
The pooling equilibrium only exists for θ ≤ min
{
λ(qh−ql)+ql−qh
qh−qh ,
λ(qh−ql)
λ(qh−ql)+ql−ql
}
. In this
equilibrium, all high quality goods are traded which means that there is no adverse selection.
In contrast to Akerlof’s model there is still inefficiency because not all low quality goods are
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traded.
4.4 Dynamic Pricing
Now assume that a seller can identify the buyer’s type, possibly at some cost, and price
discriminate between informed and uninformed buyers. This possibility leads to a market
segmentation because each seller can quote a different price depending on the buyer’s type.
In the informed buyers market, there is perfect information so that trade is always concluded
at a price equal to quality. In the following, I will analyze how the absence of informed buyers
affects equilibrium in the uninformed buyers market and, on that basis, explore the overall
welfare implications.
Given that the sellers’ cost of acquiring customer information is not prohibitively high,
efficient fully-separating equilibria no longer exist because the low quality seller offers prices
that depend on the buyer type. He offers a low price to informed buyers which is accepted.
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Therefore, the price that he offers to uninformed buyers is not affected by the informed buyers’
resistance to buy low quality at a high price. This means that the low quality seller has no
restriction to cheat and mimic the high quality seller when offering to uninformed buyers.
Anticipating this, uninformed buyers are not ready to buy at a high price unconditionally.
Corollary 9 There are no longer efficient fully-separating equilibria when customer-specific
price discrimination is possible.
There still exist the inefficient types of equilibria: fully separating equilibria, semi-separating
equilibria and the pooling equilibrium in the uninformed buyers market, but now for the
special case that the share of informed buyers is zero, θ = 0.
Inefficient Fully-Separating Equilibria
In the inefficient fully-separating equilibria, uninformed buyers only buy at the high price
with some probability β. But the possibility of price discrimination reduces the threshold β
in these equilibria because low quality sellers no longer need to factor in the loss of informed
buyers when offering at a high price. As a consequence, uninformed buyers may buy at ph
less often in order to deter low quality sellers from posting high prices. To see this, we need
to look at the low quality seller’s incentive constraint (Condition 4.6) at θ = 0:
β ≤ ql − ql
qh − ql = β˜
′
Comparing the threshold for β in the fully-separating equilibria with and without dynamic
pricing, we see that:
β˜
′
=
ql − ql
qh − ql <
ql − ql
(qh − ql)(1− θ) = β˜ (4.13)
All low quality goods are traded but there is adverse selection. Compared to the inefficient
fully-separating equilibria without price discrimination, dynamic pricing negatively affects
trade probability of highly priced goods in the uninformed buyers market if β ∈ (β˜′ , β˜] under
uniform pricing. For β < β˜
′
, dynamic pricing has no effect on welfare.
From a welfare perspective, a lower probability of trade at the high price constitutes a
negative welfare effect because high quality sellers trade less and adverse selection increases.
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Since all other market participants are indifferent between the two regimes, we can say that
overall welfare is negatively affected by price discrimination at least for β ∈ (β˜′ , β˜].4
Corollary 10 Under dynamic pricing, in the inefficient fully separating equilibria, unin-
formed buyers accept a high price p∗h = qh with probability β, where 0 ≤ β < β˜
′
< β˜.
Compared to uniform pricing, welfare is worse in these equilibria for β ∈ (β˜′ , β˜] because of
higher adverse selection.
Next, I analyze how the semi-separating equilibria are affected by the absence of informed
buyers.
Inefficient Semi-Separating Equilibria
When the share of informed buyers is zero, θ = 0, the low quality seller’s indifference condition
(Condition 4.7) becomes:
β
′
=
ql − ql
ph − ql (4.14)
Comparing β
′
, the probability with which uninformed buyers buy at a high price in the
semi-separating equilibria under dynamic pricing with β∗, the respective probability under
uniform pricing (defined by Propostition 6), it follows that
β
′
=
ql − ql
ph − ql <
ql − ql
(1− θ)(ph − ql) = β
∗ (4.15)
Since β
′
< β∗, uninformed buyers buy at the high price less often in the semi-separating
equilibria when price discrimination is possible. Again, low quality sellers do not need to
factor in the loss of informed buyers when offering a high price to uninformed buyers. The
low quality sellers’ reduced incentive to post a low price is anticipated by uninformed buyers
who buy at a high price less often. This, in turn, negatively affects the high quality sellers’
probability of trade.
Comparing the semi-separating equilibria with and without price discrimination, the fol-
lowing can be stated: The expected payoff from trading is ql − ql for low quality sellers and
4Both buyer types are indifferent between the two regimes because equilibrium prices are such that
their expected payoff from trade is zero. Low quality sellers gain ql − ql under both regimes.
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0 for uninformed buyers with and without price discrimination.5 Informed buyers gain under
uniform pricing when buying from high quality sellers because ph < qh compared to ph = qh
under dynamic pricing. But this payoff gain on part of informed buyers translates into a
payoff loss on part of high quality sellers, so that welfare is unaffected. What negatively af-
fects welfare though, is the increased reluctance to buy at a high price on part of uninformed
buyers under dynamic pricing which results in a decrease in the trade of highly priced goods
and thus an increase in adverse selection.
Corollary 11 Under dynamic pricing, in the semi-separating equilibria, uninformed buyers
accept a high price p∗h < qh with probability β
′
, where β
′
< β∗. Compared to uniform pricing,
welfare is worse in these equilibria because of higher adverse selection.
Efficient Pooling Equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium, sellers post a price equal to expected quality at that price, p =
λqh+(1−λ)ql, to uninformed buyers. High quality sellers are ready to offer the pooling price
to uninformed buyers as long as this price exceeds their reservation value:
qh ≥ λqh + (1− λ)ql
⇔ λ ≥ qh − ql
qh − ql
When sellers quote the pooling price to uninformed buyers and pi = qi to informed
buyers, then all goods are traded. The surplus from trade is captured entirely by the sellers,
where low quality sellers benefit disproportionately high compared to high quality sellers
in the uninformed buyers market because of the pooling price. Compared to the pooling
equilibrium without price discrimination, this equilibrium generates a better result in terms
of welfare because all low quality goods are traded while in the pooling equilibrium without
price discrimination, low quality goods do not always trade.
5When price discrimination is possible, low quality sellers trade with informed buyers at pl = ql,
so that the sellers’ payoff is ql − ql. Their expected payoff from trade with uninformed buyers is also
ql − ql because uninformed buyers buy less often at high prices (β′ < β∗) in order to offset the low
quality sellers’ increased incentive to offer at a high price.
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Corollary 12 If λ ≥ qh−qlqh−ql , there is an efficient pooling equilibrium in the uninformed
buyers’ market in which sellers offer p∗ = λqh + (1 − λ)ql to uninformed buyers. Compared
to uniform pricing, welfare is better in this equilibrium because all goods are traded.
With respect to consumer welfare, dynamic pricing and market segmentation is not beneficial
for informed buyers because sellers can easily identify informed buyers and push them to
their reservation value.6 In the case of uniform pricing, uninformed consumers can impart
a benefit on informed buyers because prices may be below the informed buyer’s reservation
value so to still address uninformed buyers with a higher reservation value due to their lack
of information.
The overall welfare effects of price discrimination can be subsumed as follows:
Corollary 13 Price discrimination generates an efficient equilibrium only if the average
quality is high and both types of sellers make a pooling offer to uninformed buyers. When the
average quality is low or sellers separate in their offer to uninformed buyers, price discrimi-
nation can have a negative welfare effect because it increases adverse selection.
Figure 4.2 below depicts all equilibria in the uninformed buyers market when sellers can
price discriminate. Because the market is segmented, equilibria in the uninformed buyers
market are independent of the share of informed buyers.
6Uninformed buyers are indifferent between both pricing regimes because their expected payoff is
zero in both cases.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate how market performance in a lemons market depends on the
specific information structure of the buyer side by letting some buyers be equally informed as
the sellers. I compare two different settings, one in which sellers cannot differentiate between
buyer types, which constitutes a market with two-sided asymmetric information and one in
which sellers can learn the buyer type and price discriminate on an individual level, which
eliminates asymmetric information on the seller side.
Opposed to conventional wisdom, reducing asymmetric information by facilitating price
discrimination can have a negative welfare effect in this setting because adverse selection
can increase. The reason for this, is that without sellers being able to distinguish between
informed and uninformed buyers, low quality sellers have less incentive to mimic high quality
because their sale probability at a high price is lower when informed buyers do not buy high
priced low quality. This is anticipated by uninformed buyers who are ready to buy at a high
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price more often when the market is unsegmented.
The results presented in this paper shed some light on the often neglected issue of inter-
mediate degrees of informational asymmetry and reveal the connection between the level of
market information and the level of adverse selection in a simple and intuitive manner which
may be useful in applications.
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Conclusion
The studies in this Dissertation show that bargaining theory is applicable to a wide range
of problems because many, even seemingly unrelated ‘non-economic’ interactions have a bar-
gaining problem at heart.
From a scientific point of view, the motivation for bargaining is not especially exciting
because bargaining is mutually beneficial to all parties involved. The interesting part is to
identify reasons why bargaining sometimes breaks down in spite of the potential gains.
Two different reasons for a breakdown of bargaining are explored in this Dissertation:
commitment problems and asymmetric information. While Chapters 1 and 2 concentrate on
commitment problems as a possible reason for the inability to reach an agreement in repeated
interaction, Chapters 3 and 4 focus on asymmetric information in one-time bargaining.
Commitment Problems are a source of inefficiency when binding contracts are not enforce-
able because a powerful authority capable of guaranteeing agreements is absent. It follows
that commitment problems are less prevalent in bargaining activities within the rule of law
and more relevant with regard to illegal activities and negotiations on an international level.
The basic trouble with bargaining under commitment problems is the bargainers’ incentive
to break up the negotiation before it even started when there is no guarantee that the other
party sticks to the agreement. A good way to illustrate this dilemma is by thinking of the
reason why crime witnesses are in danger of being ‘silenced forever’. Because a witness cannot
credibly commit to not go to the police and report the crime, the criminal has no rational
choice other than kill the witness, even though he would prefer the witness to live and not
tell. Chapter 1 investigates this logic within the framework of crisis bargaining between
autonomous states and preventive war as the result of bargaining breakdown.
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Compared to commitment problems, the role of asymmetric information has been exten-
sively analyzed in the bargaining literature and identified as a viable source of bargaining
inefficiencies such as strikes, wars and costly delay. Despite the very different set-ups and
fields of application, the bargaining problems in Chapters 3 and 4 boil down to a simple
negotiation between two bargainers with privately known reservation prices. In this case, an
agreement may not be struck because a bargainer with a low reservation price (low outside
option in Chapter 3 or low quality good in Chapter 4) has the incentive to pretend to be a
type with a high reservation price (high outside option in Chapter 3 or high quality good in
Chapter 4).
The inability of one negotiator to distinguish between different types of his negotiating
partner and the incentive to cheat on part of weak types can be the reason for a breakdown
in bargaining. Of course, bargaining need not necessarily break down and in bargaining
models with multiple rounds in which players have the option to reject offers and make
counteroffers, agreement can usually be reached, albeit not without cost of delay. In such
settings, inefficiencies are often the means by which bargainers become able to identify the
other party’s type and finally conclude an agreement.
Since the models presented in Chapters 3 and 4 preclude the possibility of counteroffers,
an agreement that can not be struck at once, immediately results in the worst possible
outcome, the termination of bargaining. In Chapter 3, terminating negotiations means war,
in Chapter 4, it means some buyer/seller matches do not result in trade even though trading
generates surplus.
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